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The German Parliamentary Participation Act was introduced in 1994, and further 
established in 2005, by the German Constitutional Court. This was rooted in 
Germany’s military past, granting the German Bundestag the right to give approval 
before military troop deployment. This parliamentary ruling suggests a role for 
parliament in the decision-making process on participation in Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) missions with German armed forces. However, security 
policy is often said to be in the domain of the executive as decisions on the CSDP 
are made at a European level, requiring a unanimous vote from all European 
national executives to launch a mission under the CSDP umbrella, leaving a rather 
marginal role for national parliaments in this decision-making process. The literature 
surrounding legislative-executive relations in the decision-making process of whether 
to deploy military troops is rather limited. Investigating the German case is 
particularly interesting given its geographical and economical size within the EU, and 
its constant contribution to missions within the CSDP framework. 
 
The aim of this study is to determine to what extent the German Bundestag can 
scrutinise the German executive’s decision to participate in missions within the 
CSDP framework, and thus the research question is as follows: To what extent can 
the German Bundestag influence decisions on CSDP operations? In this context, the 
parliamentary function scrutiny will lead this research as it offers a broad approach to 
parliamentary activities. This dissertation seeks to contribute to the existing literature 
on German security policy and EU integration, as well as EU security policy. The 
research question is answered primarily through exploration of Bundestag plenary 
debates as well as official documents and literature. The analysis indicates that that 
there is potential for the German Bundestag to actively scrutinise decisions by 
raising inquiries, and demanding that the executives give answers to raised 
questions about their decision to participate in operations under the CSDP umbrella 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The German Bundestag and its Parliamentary 
Prerogative  
 
1.1. Research Background  
Since the 12 July 1994 ‘Armed Forces Decision’ of Germany’s Federal Constitutional 
Court (FCC), deployment of the German armed forces is subject to prior approval by 
the German Bundestag. This decision was reinforced with the implementation of a 
law known as the Parliamentary Participation Act (PPA) or 
Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz (PBG), issued on 18 March 2005, which formally 
regulates the form and extent to which German troops participate in missions 
abroad. This regulation granted the German Bundestag a strong participatory role in 
security policy, which was formerly the exclusive domain of the executive branch. 
Thus, this thesis will analyse the following question: To what extent can the 
Bundestag scrutinise decisions about Common Security and Defence Policy 
operations?  
 
Studies conducted by Dieterich, Hummel and Marschall (2008) show that the degree 
to which different national parliaments have a say in the decision-making process 
with regard to troop deployment is variable. The German Bundestag is classified as 
a strong parliament that can exercise its veto rights for any executive mandate prior 
to the deployment of troops abroad and as such, the German Bundestag has a 
strong role to play in security policy. However, a more detailed study and evaluation 
is so far missing, despite the fact that the German Bundestag presents a very 
interesting case, having been granted the parliamentary prerogative with regard to 
German troop deployment abroad. More in-depth research on the Bundestag has not 
yet been conducted, creating a gap in scientific knowledge concerning the role of the 
German Bundestag in German security policy. Generally, the literature on German 
security policy and the role of the German Bundestag in the legislative-executive 
decision-making process on troop deployment remains rather thin. This dissertation, 
therefore, conducts in-depth research into the role of the German Bundestag in 
security policy, thereby contributing to the existing scientific knowledge in an area of 
study in which the ‘relationship between parliaments and security policy is not well 
understood’ (Mello and Peters, 2018, p.3).  
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Security policy has been defined as an area which is led by national executive 
bodies, and national parliaments have been seen to play a rather marginal role in 
security policy affairs. Additionally, there seems to be a lack of interest in the role of 
national parliaments in security policy, according to Mello and Peters (2018); the 
scholars argue that one reason for this is that public debates around security affairs 
are often inadequate due to reasons of secrecy. Therefore, there seems to be an 
imbalance in the executive-legislative relationship involved in the decision-making 
process on the issue of troop deployment. This seems to be true even in cases in 
which national parliaments such as the German Bundestag have the legal right to 
intervene in the decision-making process by giving approval prior to troop 
deployment. The focus of this research will therefore be on the executive-legislative 
relationship in the decision-making process regarding security affairs, and I will use 
this as a starting point to situate this study in the existing literature. Given that the 
German Bundestag is granted the parliamentary prerogative, this research will 
contribute to the scholarly literature on the decision-making process on troop 
deployment.  
 
The literature on EU integration and EU security policy claims that the area of 
security policy is an executive- led domain. This is due to the fact that decisions are 
made by the executive regarding military missions under the CSDP umbrella on the 
intergovernmental level; thus, this may deprive parliaments of sufficient time and 
information to conduct proper scrutiny of proposed military missions (Huff, 2013) and 
the opportunity to increase their knowledge (Born and Haenggi, 2005). The German 
Bundestag, however, gained certain influential power through the Parliamentary 
Participation Act. The head of government, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of 
Defence form the ‘classical’ executive actors in foreign policy; therefore, scholarly 
foreign policy research with regards to Germany barely focuses on the role of the 
German parliament in the process of policy making (Jaeger, Oppermann, Hoese and 
Viehrig, 2009). Literature on the German parliament’s role is reduced commonly to 
passing proposals made by the executive. The main reason for the lack of academic 
research could be due to the fact that German bureaucracy is not centred on the 
parliament but focused on the executive that generally controls policy making. Such 
lack of focus on the parliament could suggest a passive role for the Bundestag. The 
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German executive has to ensure that there is no fundamental difference between the 
executive and the political will of the parliamentarians. Such a phenomenon has 
been described as the ‘trouble-avoidance principle’ (Schwarzmeier, 2002:37). 
 
1.2. Historical Background of German Security Policy and its Parliamentary 
Prerogative 
After being militarily overpowered in the Second World War, Germany was politically 
and economically overpowered by its aftermath. Germany’s defeat in the Second 
World War resulted in a demilitarised and antimilitarist approach to German security 
policy. The German population developed a sense of ‘never again’ after the 
experiences of the lost War, and rearmament became a contentious issue as 
antimilitarism took root in German culture (Chappell, 2015). In the existing literature 
on post-war Germany, much focus has therefore been laid on the 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung —the long and challenging process of coming to terms 
with the socio-political experiences of the Second World War.  
The first step in Germany’s rearmament was its integration into the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) structures; as part of this agreement, the German 
armed forces were only to be deployed as part of multilateral cooperation. German 
reunification and the country’s entry into NATO brought about a growing international 
consensus about German security policy, namely, that German armed forces should 
now actively participate in multilateral cooperation (Bundeszentrale fuer Politische 
Bildung, 2014). As such, multilateral cooperation became important and Germany’s 
new, more active role called for new thinking, including in terms of European security 
policy. As Germany had developed to a major player on the European and 
international stage, it could no longer hide behind its ‘checkbook diplomacy’ that until 
then had shaped German security policy (Schweiger, 2004, p. 38).   
The Kosovo mission in 1999 was the first mission in which the German armed forces 
participated since 1945. German participation in out-of-area missions still remains 
controversial even though Germany has developed from solely assisting in 
humanitarian aid to participating in international peacekeeping missions. German 
security policy was shaped by ‘Never again’ and ‘Never again Ausschwitz’ as stated 
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by Foreign Minister Fischer in 19991, that rejected the idea of participation of 
German armed forces. Based on Germany’s war experiences, Foreign Minister 
Fischer highlighted the humanitarian focus of the German participation in the Kosovo 
conflict at the party convention of the Greens on 13 May 1999:  
 
Of course, for me, too, this always brings up our history and that plays a role. And I have to 
ask myself, if all of us have always used this argument in domestic matters, then why aren’t 
we using it now that expulsions and ethnic warfare have returned to Europe and bloody 
consequences have already been registered. Is that a moral arms race? Is that overkill? 





Based on the focus on the humanitarian aspect of the Kosovo mission, it was easy to 
overcome opposition of German participation (Schweiger, 2004). The humanitarian 
aspect of the mission was also highlighted by then chancellor Schroeder to the 
German public: ‘We defend freedom, democracy and human rights. We cannot allow 
that only one hour away from here by air, these values are treated with contempt’ 
(Schweiger, 2004, p. 38). 
Justifying German participation in military missions for the sake of national economic 
interests is seen as highly controversial due to Germany’s war past. In 2010, 
president Horst Koehler was criticised for his speech following his visit to German 
soldiers in Afghanistan. Koehler argued that the German participation was due to 
national economic interests: 
A country of our size, with its focus on exports and thus reliance on foreign trade, must be 
aware that… military deployments are necessary in an emergency to protect our interests- for 
example when it comes to trade route, for example when it comes to preventing regional 
instabilities that could negatively influence our trade, jobs and incomes
3
 
Due to the heavy criticisms that he received, he decided to resign from his position. 
Nevertheless, Germany continues to highlights its responsibilities to multilateral 
																																																						
1
 Speech by the Foreign Minister on the NATO Deployment in Kosovo, available at: 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Ch8_Doc07FIN.pdf 
2
 Speech by the Foreign Minister on the NATO Deployment in Kosovo, available at: 
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/Ch8_Doc07FIN.pdf 
3




cooperation. In 2014, the speech given by German President Joachim Gauck at the 
Munich Security Conference was much publicised, both at home and abroad. Gauck 
said that Germany should ‘be ready to do more to guarantee the security that others 
have provided it with for decades’ (Gauck, 2014). This was in light, as he pointed 
out, of the fact that ‘some people at home and abroad… regard Germany as the 
shirker in the international community…Germany is all too ready to duck difficult 
issues’ (Gauck, 2014). This perception had developed as a result of Germany's 
behaviour following the loss of World War II, which many described as a 'never 
again' attitude.  
Germany is a committed partner in the EU’s security structures, observing the 2011 
Defence Policy Guidelines, and Germany’s White Paper 2016 on German Security 
Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. Germany, along with France and the 
United Kingdom, ‘was the core nation in the setting up of CSDP: it had prepared the 
Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defence, which was adopted by the European Council in Cologne 1999…[T]he 
country invested itself in the creation of both military and civilian headline goals and 
the establishment of the Battlegroups, as well as of the crisis management 
structures’ (White Paper, 2016). However, ‘for Berlin, the primary interest has always 
been the promotion of member states’ integration in the area of security and defence 
policy…and CSDP missions and operations were much less a German priority’ 
(White Paper, 2016).  
 
Following Germany’s reunification and regaining of its full sovereignty, the country 
began to participate in international military operations. However, German 
participation is distinct from that of other NATO or EU member states in terms of its 
participation in multilateral cooperation. In many EU member states, the executive 
has the final say on troop deployment, whereas in Germany it is obligatory for the 
German executive, under all circumstances, to bring the decision to deploy military 
troops before parliament, and a parliamentary vote is a prerequisite to deployment. 
The German Bundestag was granted the right to play a decisive role in the decision-
making process to deploy military troops abroad, with the ruling of the Parliamentary 
Participation Act (PPA).  
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The German PPA, consequently, has been the subject of various discussions in 
academia, as well as in domestic and EU politics. Stratulat, Emmanouilidis, Fischer, 
and Piedrafita (2014) argue that the Federal Constitution Court (FCC) ruling4, 
demanding an active role for the Bundestag in key EU decisions, has significantly 
enhanced the role of the German parliament in EU security affairs. Colvin (2015) 
agrees, arguing that the ruling has strengthened the role of the Bundestag by placing 
the German Bundestag at the heart of EU affairs, and that the powers of control for 
the parliament that were established provide new opportunities for political 
involvement. On the other hand, von Krause (2015) argues that the parliamentary 
prerogative opens up a discussion on whether Germany can be seen as a reliable 
partner, as this parliamentary structure could constitute a hindrance to multilateral 
security cooperation due to a lengthy decision-making process at the national level.  
 
Generally, in the current literature, the role of national parliaments within the area of 
security policy remains rather marginal. This is because the legislature’s position in 
the field of security mirrors the traditional view that parliamentary participation in the 
decision-making process is rather redundant, as plenary debates of security affairs 
are problematic, due to the necessity of secrecy.  Parliamentary discussion is seen 
as bogging down an area of rapid decision making; indeed, the area of security in 
general is seen as less of a concern for the public than general domestic affairs 
(Mello and Peters, 2018). However, evaluation of the role of national parliaments in 
security affairs is particularly interesting within the framework of the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This is because the CSDP is in many ways the 
exemplar of the ‘multi-level’ and ‘multi-layered’ nature of EU policy-making (Wouters 
& Raube, 2012, p. 3). The CSDP has a structure that operates at both the national 
and European level. The decision-making process for CSDP-related matters (e.g., 
whether to launch a mission and the details thereof) is one that necessitates 
unanimity among the foreign ministers of all the member states in the Foreign Affairs 
Council and heads of state and government in the European Council at the pan-
European level (Howorth, 2011).  
The challenge for national parliaments is that ‘the authority which has been 
transferred to the EU resides in the European Council or the Council of Ministers, so 
																																																						
4
 BVerfGE 90, 286, 387 f, the 12 July 1994 Armed Forces Decision 
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there has been a transfer of decision-making authority from the parliamentary level 
to the member states’ executive [level]’ (Holzacker, 2008, p. 142). In addition, it is 
the executive that decides at the national level on individual member states’ 
participation (with some exceptions, in that parliaments are granted a veto right), 
leaving national parliaments a rather marginal role to play in security policy, which 
lies outside the normal scope of parliamentary involvement (Peters, Wagner & 
Deitelhoff, 2008).  
In the literature on the role of national parliaments in EU policy-making, the German 
parliament is considered to have strong powers of scrutiny compared to those of 
other national parliaments (Wendler, 2016; Auel, 2017), yet makes little use of it 
(Sprungk, 2010). The question thus arises as to whether the Bundestag is a ‘rubber 
stamp’ or an ‘active scrutiniser’ in this particular area of security policy, which is 
widely held to be executive-led. Whether a formal regulation alone (such as the 
BVerfGE 90 286, 387 f.) can enable active parliamentary scrutiny over decisions 
made at the supranational level, or whether informal factors play a role in the 
legislative-executive relationship (and thus, whether the Bundestag is a ‘rubber 
stamp’ or an ‘active scrutiniser’) is the subject of this thesis.  
 
1.3. Objective and Research Questions  
Based on the previously mentioned argument, the objective of this study is to gain 
knowledge about the role the German Bundestag plays in the decision-making 
process in EU security affairs, specifically German troop deployment. As such, this 
dissertation aims to identify the mechanisms that the Bundestag can activate to 
participate in decisions on EU security affairs in general, and for this study, the two 
chosen CSDP mission in particular.  
 
In order to answer the research questions, a literature review and document analysis 
will be implemented to shed light on the questions, which will be further evaluated in 
section xx. The purpose of the literature review is to lay the foundations of this 
research, to understand and to identify what has been written so far in scholarly 
literature on the role of the German Bundestag in decisions on EU security matters , 
and finally, to pinpoint the gap in the literature that creates the question around its 
actual role and the peculiarity of the parliamentary prerogative. The empirical part of 
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the document analysis is based on the plenary protocols of the German Bundestag. 
The purpose of the document analysis is to explore what is being discussed during 
the plenary debates in the German Bundestag, and to understand the different 
positions of parliamentarians, thus shed some light on the questions posed by this 
research.   
 
In particular, this thesis seeks to analyse the role of the Bundestag on two levels: (a) 
On the intergovernmental level, the Bundestag’s “parliamentary prerogative” offers 
various perspectives for analysis, such as Germany’s obligations to multilateral 
cooperation (b) On the national level, it is worth noticing that the PPA grants the 
Bundestag several rights of participation in decisions to deploy German armed 
forces abroad (such as the right of information from the executive and the right to 
recall German troops even after they are deployed). To help answer the primary 
research question, namely to what extent can the Bundestag scrutinise decisions 
about Common Security and Defence Policy operations? This paper will address the 
following sub-questions: 
 
1. The legislative-executive relations in security policy: What are the factors that the 
Bundestag can use to exert influence the executive in decisions about deployment of 
troops? 
 
2. The scope of the Bundestag to influence security policy: Which parliamentary 
scrutiny mechanisms can influence decisions about the deployment of troops? 
 
The first sub-question aims to discover the balance between the executive and the 
legislative branches of the German government. The literature on EU integration and 
EU security policy has already evaluated the extent to which legal regulations can 
constrain the government’s decisions on troop deployment. Even though the area of 
security affairs is thought to be executive-led, parliaments have developed ways of 
influencing the decision-making process, mainly by the legislative authority to prior-
veto troop deployment. The German legislative right to prior approval relates only to 
military missions and not to civilian missions (which include the provision of police 
forces or the establishment and reinforcement of a country’s legal system, for 
instance). Thus, as Mello and Peters (2018) argue, the absence of a formal veto 
right does not mean that the legislature has no competence over sending troops 
abroad; parliaments can be informed prior to troop deployment and can state their 
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position. For civilian missions, Germany does not require any parliamentary 
approval; analysing both a military and a civilian mission comparatively might tell us 
whether the German can exert some sort of influence even without exercising a 
formal prior approval of troop deployment.  
 
The second sub-question focuses on the mechanisms of scrutiny. To understand 
how the German parliament can exert influence over CSDP-related matters, it is 
important to consider the specific mechanisms that can be activated by the relevant 
actors. Auel and Benz (2005, p. 374) conceptualise the term ‘mechanisms’ as 
meaning the ‘patterns of causes and effects that determine social processes and 
explain how institutions work in practice’. National parliaments have several such 
mechanisms, unique to each member state and thus varying in degree and 
effectiveness (Cygan, 2013). This research will particularly focus on the three 
mechanisms established by Born and Haenggi (2005) in order to institute the 
Bundestag´s scrutiny influence.   
 
1.4. Case Study selection 
This thesis applies a case study approach in order to analyse the role of the German 
Bundestag in security affairs decision making. This section will outline the reasons 
why the German case is particularly interesting case to observe in the interplay 
between executive and parliament in the decision- making process on security 
affairs.  
 
Country selection- Germany 
Why is the German Bundestag a good case to examine? Parliamentary literature on 
EU foreign and security policy often focuses on the European Parliament (cf. Rosen, 
2015) and little attention has been paid to member states’ parliaments. The German 
Bundestag is particularly interesting because it has the legal right, based on the 
German basic law and known as the Parliamentary Participation Act, to give 
approval before military troop deployment (no approval needed for humanitarian 
missions). Contrary to the belief that parliaments may have lost parliamentary 
influencing power due to the EU integration process, the fact that the Bundestag has 
the last say on a very important subject that includes civilian lives symbolises 
legislative responsibility and a strong position in influencing the executive domain. 
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The German Parliamentary approval prior troop deployment is not unique in the EU 
as several countries have this legislative right build in their constitution (see Table 
2.2.). Yet, the role of the German Parliament in decisions on the deployment of 
military troops offers various starting points for a closer examination that justify the 
country selection: Germany’s emerging role as a supporter and supplier of troops to 
out- of- area operations and with this, the significant change in the reunited German 
security policy. Germany is the largest EU country, both economically and 
population-wise and forms a vital part in EU politics. Lastly, Germany’s focus on 
multilateral cooperation, in particular alongside Germany’s closest EU’ partners 
Britain and France, two countries in which no parliamentary approval is required 
before troop deployment and the decision to deploy troops lies in the hands of the 
British and French executive. It is intriguing to me how these aspects work in 
combination with the German parliamentary prerogative.  
 
1.5. The Structure of the Thesis 
In the following chapters, I will to set the stage for this study and answer the 
research questions. To do this, I will start with establishing a theoretical discussion 
on the role of national parliaments in EU policy and within the CSDP structures, 
highlighting the discussion of the de- and reparliamentarisation thesis in Chapter 2. 
This chapter also establishes the research design which is based on Born and 
Haenggi’s (2004) Triple A framework. Chapter 3 evaluates the German security 
context, thus, the German parliamentary prerogative, its historical roots and its legal 
background. The chapter 3 also discusses problems arising from legislative 
involvement in decisions on troop deployment as well as opportunities for the 
parliament to get involved. In order to put theory into practice, Chapter 4 will analyse 
two chosen CSDP operations, namely the military mission NAVFOR Atalanta and 
the civilian mission EUCAP Somalia. The final chapter (Chapter 5) presents the 







Chapter 2: Research Design 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
In order to answer the question whether the German Bundestag has a say in the 
decision- making process, it is necessary to address the theoretical debates of 
national parliaments in EU integration and the role of parliaments within security 
structures first, with the aim of laying the foundations of the operationalisation of the 
framework of analysis of the thesis. Traditionally, national parliaments play a rather 
marginal role in security policy as it is said to be an executive- led domain. Like 
Germany, some European national parliaments are granted a parliamentary 
prerogative to engage in security policy decisions such as the deployment of troops. 
Within the settings of the CSDP framework and since its introduction in 1999, the 
role of national parliaments was raised in light of the democratic accountability. The 
area of security policy differs though from other policy areas in three particular 
points: the high level of secrecy, decisions in security affairs require a fast decision- 
making process and the area of security happens on the intergovernmental level. 
The latter is in particular interesting for the scope of this thesis and this chapter that 
is to analyse the discussions in existing literature on the role of national parliaments 
within the area of security affairs and in particular the CSDP architecture.  
 
The aim of this chapter is twofold: The first part seeks to set the stage for the 
analysis of the EU security framework for a better understanding of the role of 
national parliaments in EU integration, security policy as well as international security 
structures. The second part outlines the research design for this thesis and argues 
why the Triple A- framework (Born and Haenggi, 2004) fits best for the purpose of 
this thesis.  
 
2.2. National parliaments in EU integration and security policy- a theoretical 
debate 
This section outlines the theoretical discussion on the role of national parliaments in 
the existing literature on EU integration and security policy. The discussions highlight 
that the role of national parliaments and their empowerment in EU integration and 
security affairs often cannot be sufficiently explained.  
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Legislative involvement in the area of security policy remains rather marginal for 
parliaments and under ‘the firm control of national governments’ (Wagner and 
Kantner, 2014, p. 384). National parliaments are accustomed to deal with security 
matters within the national context; thus, it does not come naturally for legislatures to 
scrutinise matters on the supranational level (Maatsch, 2016). The decision to deploy 
military troops abroad within the CSDP framework involves the Council and the 
Political and Security Committee on a European level as well as the member states’ 
executives. Scholars argue, however, that parliaments can exercise a say in security 
policy in their role as veto players.  
 
When examining the development of the EU, the roles of national parliaments have 
become more important over time. It is interesting to observe such a development 
when dealing with theories of European integration and whether such an increased 
role of national parliaments in EU affairs can be explained with established 
integration theories. European integration is often described from two different 
viewpoints: neofunctionalism (Haas, 1958; Lindberg 1963) and the liberal 
intergovernmental approach (Moravcsik, 1993). Interesting for the scope of this 
thesis is to examine the role that formal and informal legislative power of European 
national parliaments play in EU security integration. Neofunctionalism focuses not 
only on the member state as the key actor, but also on the state as a non-unitary 
actor. The concept of spillover is seen as the key mechanism of EU integration and 
argues that the integration in one policy area will lead to integration to other policy 
areas. From a liberal intergovernmental perspective, the member states are seen as 
the most important actors and further integration will mean benefits for the member 
states.  
 
In terms of the increasing parliamentary power from a neofunctionalist perspective, 
i.e. the spillover effect, parliamentary influence has increased in some policy areas 
leading to the assumption that this would apply to other policy areas as well. While 
national parliaments have gained more rights to participate in EU policymaking 
(granted by the Treaty of Lisbon), the area of security policy still has limited 
parliamentary influence. This suggests that neofunctionalism may not be sufficient in 
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order to understand an empowered national parliament and the participation rights in 
the area of security policy. 
 
The intergovernmental approach was developed by Stanley Hoffmann (1964) as a 
counter-perspective to neofunctionalism of EU integration. This approach is built on 
the realist perspective about states and, more precisely, about the states’ executives 
playing the ultimate role in key decision-making (Bache, et al., 2015). In 1993, 
Andrew Moravcsik presented a new approach known as liberal 
intergovernmentalism, a theory which built on the existing intergovernmentalist 
approach. The liberal intergovernmental perspective sees the EU member states 
executives as the main actors in the EU (Hix, 2007, p. 576). National executives 
share different policy preferences, which they transfer to the EU level. In economic 
policy, for instance, governments have usually been preferring economic integration 
over political integration, in the German case, the executive has been in favour of 
both policy areas equally (Hix, 2011). European integration is a process which 
results from the member states’ interests and benefits. As a result, Moravcsik argues 
that supranational institutions reflect the member states’ interests (Bache, et al., 
2015). Security policy is even more restricted to national parliaments as the decision-
making process is made solely on the EU level.  
 
In security policy, from the intergovernmentalist view, the power lies with the 
executive. Some European national parliaments have the legal authority to veto their 
government’s proposal to send troops abroad. However, such parliamentary veto 
power does not secure efficient power of scrutiny over CSDP-related affairs. 
Especially in the area of security policy and European military cooperation (such as 
under the CSDP umbrella), the decision-making right lies with the executive. Once 
the national government has decided on a proposal to deploy military troops abroad, 
security policy procedures may restrict the opportunity to impose a veto to this 
decision (Moravcsik, 1994). If the parliament would reject the executive’s proposal, it 
‘may be costly, sometimes prohibitively so, for national parliaments, publics or 
officials to reject, amend or block ratification of and compliance with decisions 
reached by national executives in international fora’ (Moravcsik, 1994, p.11). Liberal 
intergovernmentalism may only offer a limited explanation of the growing role of 
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parliaments in the EU integration process as the focus is on the executive rather 
than the legislature.  
 
A different perspective to the traditional approaches of neofunctionalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism to European integration is the new institutionalist approach. In 
the existing literature, institutions such as parliaments are often considered from a 
neoinstitutionalist perspective. The neoinstitutionalist view elaborates on the 
mechanisms that define how parliaments work (such as by means of their 
committees) and defines the interplay between the legislature and the executive 
(Auel and Benz, 2005). Parliaments, including parties, politics and policies, are not 
necessarily separable from the European level, and the new institutionalist approach 
provides an opportunity to shed light on these parliamentary structures, as in 
parliaments institutional as well as individual aspects play an important role 
(Obrecht, 2006). 
 
The new institutionalist approach consists of several approaches, with the main 
focus on rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological 
institutionalism. The main aim is to examine the role that institutions play in the 
determination of political outcomes (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Among these 
approaches, there is substantial understanding that all three approaches agree to 
acknowledge that institutions are based on rules that structure behaviour. Generally, 
institutionalists emphasise the role of institutions and the role they play in structuring 
behaviour (Steinmo, 2008). Definitions may suggest a starting point to differentiate 
between the different approaches, and although at times borders may be blurry and 
overlap, they are distinct at the same time and differ in the understanding of the term 
institutions and the relationship between actors and structures. One main difference 
can be found in the way ‘the nature of the beings whose actions or behaviours is 
being structured’ is understood’ (Steinmo, 2008, p. 126).  
 
Hall and Thelen (2009, p. 9) conceptualised institutions as ‘sets of regularized 
practices with a rule-like quality in the sense that the actors expect the practices to 
be observed; and which… cases are supported by formal sanctions’. The 
neoinstitutionalist approaches share the view that behaviour can be determined by 
the institutional context and the acotors’ preferences. They all consider that 
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‘institutions matter’. However, they differ in their perceptions of institutions and the 
basis of actors’ preferences, which may include the different explanations of how 
actors interpret rules and the motivational drivers (Auel and Christiansen, 2015). 
According to the new institutionalist approach, institutions are able to form political 
behaviour through the institutional features of ‘standard operating procedures, so-
called soft-laws, norms, and conventions of behaviour’ (Bulmer, 1993, p.  355).  
 
Based on March and Olsen (1995), the parliamentary role in the EU can be 
explained by either the logic of consequentiality or the logic of appropriateness. The 
logic of consequentiality argues that actors’ behaviour considers the consequences 
of the actors’ actions in their preferences based on rationality, whereas the logic of 
appropriateness considers their actions according to cultural norms and rules (March 
and Olsen, 1995, p. 154). From a rational choice institutionalist perspective, 
‘institutions represent a strategic operating environment, actors have less ability to 
set priorities independent of the institutional context. In this view, human action is 
more context-driven than goal-driven’ (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000, p. 6-7). 
Meanwhile, the approaches of historical and sociological institutionalism understand 
an institution as a ‘political environment or cultural context which alters the 
individual’s sense of what is in her best interests-in other words, actors are 
conditioned by the accumulation of procedures, rules, and norms over time… (in 
which) identities, priorities, interpretations of reality are all created by this context’ 
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000, pp. 6-7).  
 
Rational choice institutionalism analyses ‘the choices made by rational actors under 
conditions of interdependence’ (Immergut, 1998, p. 12). From this perspective, the 
logic of consequentiality sees actors as rational effectiveness maximisers with fixed 
preferences. Members of parliament (MPs) are mainly motivated to increase their 
chance of re-election and to improve their careers (Auel and Christianse, 2015). An 
individual is an actor who acts to maximise effectiveness driven by strategic calculus: 
‘an actor’s behavior is likely to be driven, not by impersonal historical forces, but by a 
strategic calculus and, second, that this calculus will be deeply affected by the 
actor’s expectations about how other are likely to behave as well’ (Hall and Taylor, 
1996, p. 945). The rational choice view assumes that social action is formed by 
‘social actors, their preferences and interests’ in which social actors are involved in 
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institutions if they see benefits in terms of their own preferences (Rittberger, 2005, p. 
16). The principal-agent analysis has become a key rationalist aspect of EU affairs 
(Rosamond, 2016, p. 85). This approach underlines the striving of principals, in this 
case national governments, in directing their agents i.e. national executives. The 
main aim of this model is to describe the asymmetry of information between both 
actors (Auel and Benz, 2005). Rosamond (2016, p. 85) argues that, as rational 
choice institutionalism focuses on formal rules, the approach falls short in 
acknowledging the various informal processes, which may enlighten the 
understanding of policy outcomes. In addition, the preferences of actors are seen to 
be rather inflexible within processes that can frame interests and identities 
(Rosamond, 2016).  
 
Historical institutionalism emphasises institutional choices based on their long-term 
impact, known as path dependency. This approach argues that previous decisions 
made will reflect on future decisions i.e. following the same path ‘inherited from the 
past’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 941). Path dependency explains the ‘lock-in’ factor 
when certain patterns which have evolved during previous decision-making 
processes have become ongoing processes (Rosamond, 2016). As historical 
institutionalism builds on the path dependent logic, the role of national parliaments in 
EU related affairs may not be explained well as MPs’ preferences may change over 
time and are unlikely to be resistant to change under new circumstances, such as 
newly gained rights in treaties. Historical institutionalism focuses on the long-term 
effects of institutional decisions.  
 
The sociological institutionalist approach is focused on the roles of the institution on 
behaviour defined by norms. The logic of appropriateness stresses that preferences 
are not established and are, therefore, flexible (March and Olsen, 1989). Sociological 
institutionalism is similar to the constructivist approach with regards to EU-related 
studies (Bache, et al., 2015). Although sociological institutionalism is closely linked to 
constructivism, it differs in some respects. Constructivism, according to Adler (1997, 
p.  322), reflects ‘the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by 
human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic 
interpretations of the material world’. Both sociological institutionalism and 
constructivism start with the rejection of some of the features of rational choice 
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institutionalism and emphasise on the facet of culture (Bache, et al., 2015). 
Sociological institutionalism is rooted in considerations of the consistency of the 
actors’ actions with cultural and political norms and rules (March and Olsen, 1995, p. 
154). This approach derives from the perspective that parliamentary activity is 
guided by the logic of appropriateness that includes formal and informal rules and 
norms for parliamentary behaviour. Rittberger (2005) uses the new institutional 
approach to explain the empowerment of the EP in the EU integration process. In 
parliamentary studies, the sociological institutionalist approach provides an 
understanding of the ‘constitutive effects of domestic norms of democratic 
governance on states and their behaviour’ (Rittberger, 2005, p. 23).  
 
From a realist perspective, for the executive to be more efficient in the area of 
security policy, the executive requires greater independence from parliament (Bajtay, 
2015). The area of security policy is specifically an area in which parliaments may 
only play a role in preventing the weakening of the executive’s room for manoeuvre 
(Peters, et al., 2008, p.  4). Consequently, the relationship between the executive 
and the legislature in security affairs has attracted much literature (Wagner, Herranz- 
Surralles, Kaarbo and Ostermann, 2017; Raunio, 2016; Scott and Carter, 2014). The 
area of security policy is very much dominated by the executive and parliament is 
said to play a rather marginal role therein. This is because decisions of security 
policy are considered to have limited openness and a high level of secrecy.  
 
The role of national parliaments and the EP in security policy has become the focus 
of debate in scholarly literature. Specifically, in terms of the EU integration process, a 
growing interest in the involvement of parliaments in security policy after the Cold 
War has been observed. Scholars of EU security policy focus on the role of 
individual national parliaments in CSDP operations (Born, et al., 2008), by which it 
becomes visible how national parliaments can contribute to EU security policy. 
Despite the fact that there has been a growth in democratisation and parliamentary 
legitimacy, parliamentary involvement in security policy still falls short in terms of its 
oversight of policies.  
 
The fact that parliaments play a marginal role in security policy, however, contrasts 
the rather strong role in exercising traditional functions that parliaments are 
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appointed to in other domestic policy-making areas concerning executive oversight 
(Raube and Wouters, 2016). Despite the fact that the domain of security policy is 
regarded to be executive-led, there is no valid argument regarding why this should 
be the case and different to other policy areas (Peters, Wagner and Deitelhoff, 
2010). In fact, the role of national parliaments may not be so marginal after all, even 
though perhaps not directly linked to the decision- making process as such. 
According to Noulas (2011), parliamentary participation in security policy occurs at 
two levels: the institutional level, which includes the ratification of treaties and the 
enactment of laws that are related to the field of security, including the approval of 
budget, and the diplomatic level, which serves to build and strengthen cooperation 
with other parliaments in the form of bilateral diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy 
by delegations in meetings, such as the Council of Europe, and in inter-
parliamentary and friendship groups. Fahey and Curtin (2014, p. 44) defined the role 
of parliament as the ‘institutional competence’ in the international arena and its role 
in the enactment of a state’s foreign and security policy. When both are combined, it 
can be seen that parliaments carry out different activities at an international level that 
include both institutional competences as well as being a ‘central factor of internal 
political scene’ (Fahey and Curtin, 2014, p. 44). 
 
De- versus Reparliamentarisation of European Affairs   
As the before mentioned section highlights, the role of national parliaments has been 
vastly discussed in the literature. The CSDP is a particularly interesting case as it is 
situated at the heart of two fields that have challenged the role of national 
parliaments- European integration, and the area of security policy (Huff, 2013). Thus, 
this section will focus on the de- and reparliamentarisation debate, that discusses the 
loses of parliamentary competences on the European level while certain 
mechanisms have been identified in literature for the opportunity for parliaments to 
regain control over EU related matters.  
 
To begin with, when discussing the role of national parliaments and their ability to 
scrutinise the executive’s decision over troop deployment in EU affairs one has to 
determine the general possibility for parliament to engage in the decision- making 
process. In scholarly literature, two dominant discussions come to mind: the 
deparliamentarisation thesis on the one hand, and the reparliamentarisation thesis 
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on the other. The former refers to a loss of parliamentary influence in policy making 
as legislative competences are continuously shifted to the EU level whereas the 
latter argues that national parliaments developed influencing powers and gained a 
stronger position to exert influence decisions over EU related affairs (Auel and 
Christiansen, 2015).  
 
One discussion centres on the issue of whether parliaments have become the 
victims or losers of EU integration due to the so-called deparliamentarisation 
process, which is seen to lead to a democratic deficit in the EU policy process 
(Norton, 1996; Maurer and Wessels, 2001; O'Brennan and Raunio, 2007). The 
European integration has enabled the transfer of the rights of national member 
states to the supranational level. The integration process has been particularly 
noticeable for national parliaments as they have lost a large number of their original 
functions to the supranational level, causing a loss of their legislative competence 
(Andersen and Burns, 1996; Schuettemeyer, 2003; Labitzke, 2016).  
 
National parliaments are believed to have lost constitutionally because power has 
been delegated to EU institutions, creating a stronger role for executives at the cost 
of national legislatures (Raunio and Hix, 2000). The main argument is that the EU 
has gradually undermined the relevance of national parliaments, resulting in them 
being the victims of the European integration process. Raunio and Hix (2003) argued 
that the integration process is only one aspect of the broader issue of 
deparliamentarisation and stated that factors like a strong role of executive have 
actively contributed to the fact that national parliaments have lost their capability. 
Much of the literature has dealt with the post-parliamentarism (Benz, 1998; 
Marschall, 2002; 2016) idea that is based on the assumption that one aspect why 
parliaments have lost constitutional power is due to the “spread of co-operative 
forms of policy making” (Denters, et al., 2003, p. 213), i.e. the EU integration 
process. Studies in the area of security policy in particular argue for an executive-led 
domain whereby parliaments are considered insufficient or ineffective regarding the 
exercise of parliamentary scrutiny over the executive’s decisions.  
 
Baldwin (2004, p. 297) analyses various factors that have reinforced the de-
parliamentarisation process, such as: a) the growth in the activity and scope of the 
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government at both the national and international level and the resulting increase in 
the size of governmental bureaucracies, and b) the greater capacity of an executive 
to respond to developments in a timely fashion, formulating policy and providing 
leadership on the national stage and in the international arena. To Jans and 
Piedrafita (2009, p. 19), the marginalisation of national parliaments includes a 
reduced national policy autonomy, a shift in the domestic executive- legislative 
balance, and information asymmetries.  
 
Contrary to the de-parliamentarisation thesis, studies have focused on the process of 
reparliamentarisation or neo-parliamentarism (Marschall, 2002; 2016), which reflects 
newly gained methods of influencing and scrutinising European politics and obtained 
new prospects for participation in national policy making (Auel and Christiansen, 
2015). Scholars, however, have criticised this notion and argued that changes in the 
EU treaties have helped parliaments to increase their influence and control over EU 
affairs (Raunio, 1999; Raunio and Hix, 2000). One way of strengthening the role of 
national parliaments in the EU is through network activities, which often include 
cooperation between the European Parliament (EP) and other national parliaments 
in order to exchange information and expertise. A resilient parliamentary position 
would strengthen the neo-parliamentarist theory (reparliamentarisation), a theoretical 
assumption that national parliaments have ‘fought their way back’ by exercising their 
influence to shape EU policymaking (Auel and Benz, 2005; O’Brennan and Raunio, 
2007; Auel and Christiansen, 2015). 
 
2.3. The role of parliaments within international security structures  
This section starts by setting out the challenges for parliaments in international 
structures by elaborating on the much discussed democratic deficit debate that 
highlights the lack of parliamentary legitimacy due to the decision- making process 
on the EU level in which parliaments have only a limited role to play.  
 
The dynamic development of the EU crisis management challenges the democratic 
legitimacy of the CSDP framework (Schmidt- Radefeldt, 2009).  The role of 
parliaments in EU integration and the loss of legitimacy due to the fact that decisions 
are made on the EU level has been classified as the concept of democratic deficit. 
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There is a broad agreement among scholars that national parliaments have lost 
democratic legitimacy due to the fact that decisions are made on the EU level. Other 
scholars go a step further and refer to the double democratic deficit. This is because 
national parliaments are neither involved in the scrutiny of policies nor in the 
decision-making process. Moravcsik (2002) is critical of the idea of a democratic 
deficit and argues that parliaments do not lose authority if the EU takes controls of 
affairs which were not influenced by national parliaments beforehand. Moravcik 
(2002, p. 612) rejected the idea of a European ‘democratic deficit’ as national 
parliaments have a say on EU policies, yet their de facto capability to contribute to 
EU policies differs greatly among the different member states. 
 
Yet, security policy falls into the area in which national executives make decisions on 
the EU level and, therefore, the argument that national parliaments suffer from a 
democratic deficit may be valid. Parliamentarians may have the opportunity to 
engage in the decision-making process in international organisations through 
established parliamentary assemblies. Kraft-Kasack (2008) examines the EP, the 
Nordic Council, and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference and concludes that a 
parliament can enhance its democratic legitimacy and assemblies can provide 
additional legitimacy in international cooperation. There has been growing interest in 
the research of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the area of security policy, 
particularly in the EU.  
 
While it is important to examine the role of national parliaments and the EP 
separately, literature on the role of parliaments in international organisations has 
recently increased. One method of engaging in international organisations is via the 
interaction between parliaments beyond the national level. The interaction on a 
transnational level is focused on formal bodies of parliamentary cooperation, such as 
transnational parliamentary assemblies like the WEU Assembly and NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly. This interaction on the transnational level has been 
labelled the ‘multilevel parliamentary field’ (Crum and Fossum, 2009). Research in 
this area of parliamentary interaction contributes to the democratic scrutiny of EU 
security policy (Peters, et al., 2013). On the same note, such interactions may 
enhance ‘competitive dynamics’ caused by a mismatch of daily EU policymaking 
practice and formal powers (Herranz-Surralles, 2014, p. 971). Scholars refer to 
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‘collusive delegation’ and argue for an empowerment of national executives by which 
executives try to secure autonomy over national parliamentary control and scrutiny 
(Jorgensen and Laatikainen, 2013). In addition, although intergovernmental 
cooperation may reduce a state’s autonomy, it may also strengthen the executive’s 
position in another policy area, which is under government control (Costa and 
Jorgensen, 2012).  
  
The CSDP is an interesting case in form of the decision- making process. The 
decision to deploy military troops abroad within the CSDP framework involves the 
Council and the Political and Security Committee on a European level as well as the 
member states’ executives.  Parliamentary influencing power seems to be limited to 
the national level if parliaments have a say at all. Studies in the area of security 
policy in particular argue for an executive-led domain where parliaments are 
considered insufficient or ineffective regarding the exercise of parliamentary 
influence (Raunio and Wagner, 2016). There is a particular challenge for such 
influence and control of EU security policy due to the intergovernmental nature of the 
decision-making of the CSDP. The field of security policy is said to be an executive 
domain because decisions are made by the executive on the supranational level and 
thus ‘far away from national parliaments’ (Wouters and Raube, 2012), providing a 
challenge to parliamentary scrutiny over the decision- making process. This is a very 
interesting case in terms of parliamentary involvement as only on national level, 
national parliaments are able to play a role and scrutinise and this only if they are 
formally granted a parliamentary prerogative. 
 
In regards to parliamentary rights to, and possibilities for, participation in security 
affairs, the subject of parliamentary veto power has become one of the main 
discussions in the existing literature (Crum and Fossum, 2013). Veto power has 
been described as the ‘ability to determine details of an operation. National 
parliaments have different instruments at hand by which they can exert control over 
decisions on troop deployments' (Moelling and von Voss, 2015, p.6). Such veto 
power is exercised to different degrees in different national democracies, meaning 
that the legislatures have different experiences in exercising their power (Dieterich et 
al., 2009), Peters and Wagner (2011) refer to the authorisation of military 
deployment as the concept of parliamentary ‘war power’. The following section will 
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take a closer look at parliamentary veto power opportunities to scrutinise the 
executive.  
 
2.4. Parliamentary Veto Power and parliamentary ‘War Powers’  
One key aspect of parliamentary scrutiny is the legal right to veto decisions on troop 
deployment. Scholars have examined the presence of parliamentary veto rights 
(Wagner, et al., 2010; Born, et al., 2008) and the various parliamentary control 
competences in security policy (Peters and Wagner, 2014). In some national 
member states, decisions on CSDP missions are in the hands of the national 
executive, whereas in others, the national parliaments have a veto right prior troop 
deployment. In light of the previous discussion on the importance of 
reparliamentarisation of national parliaments in EU politics, it can be argued that 
national parliaments do play an important role in the CSDP structures as well given 
the fact that national parliaments have the right to give approval in military troop 
deployment in 17 European member states. Thus, their influence is not only 
important to their own national security policy but also in respect to security policy of 
other member states and to a successful CSDP (Moelling and Vos, 2015). 
 
Evaluating the legislative- executive relationship in decisions on CSDP is important 
for reasons as the parliamentary veto right is regarded to be vital in this policy area. 
Research has focused primarily on the parliamentary prerogative e.g. the right to 
veto the deployment of armed forces abroad and found that a prerogative can be 
regarded as the most powerful tool to scrutinise security policy (Wagner, et al., 2010; 
Born, et al., 2008). In a 2011 study5, Peters and Wagner analysed the causes for the 
different decision- making process in the use of force. Peter and Wagner questioned 
why in the case of military participation of national armed forces, some democracies 
grant their parliaments a veto right while the decision in other democracies is 
reserved for the government alone. The scholar used a data set of 49 democracies 
and they concluded that the variance does not influence whether a country has a 
presidential or a parliamentary system, and that there are parliamentary veto rights 
in democracies that are under British constitutional tradition. One particular aspect, 
																																																						
5
 See also Peters et al., (2010) 
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however, among others, was that a parliamentary prerogative dates back to histories 
of war times (Peters and Wagner, 2010).  
 
According to a study by Dieterich, Hummel and Marschall, 2008, the German 
Bundestag is classified as a strong parliament (type 1) that can exercise its veto 
rights for every executive mandate prior to deploy troops abroad (see Table 2.1. + 
2.2.).  
 




Table 2.2.: National Parliaments and their aggregated war powers in 2003 (Dieterich, 
Hummel and Marschall, 2008) 
 
 
Parliamentary scrutiny though means more than just the formal right to veto 
decisions on the deployment of troops. There has been growing recognition that 
effective parliamentary scrutiny over CSDP related matters should be grounded in an 
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understanding of the institutional factors such as a parliamentary prerogative 
(Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Huff, 2015), the resources available to MPs including 
staff expertise (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Huff, 2015), and the social factors that 
drive MPs to engage in security policy matters including the various mechanisms 
that parliamentary actors can activate (Sprungk, 2003; Finke and Herbel, 2015; Huff, 
2015).  
 
While the legal authority may be a strong influential factor in such decisions, Mello 
(2012, p. 446), having analysed democratic legislative participation in the Iraq War, 
found that it is critical not only to look at institutional rules but also at the executive-
legislative relationship. Mello (2012: 446) further argues that ‘mandatory 
parliamentary approval is unlikely to amount a legislative veto point’. Hence, the 
parliamentary role in the CSDP frameworkk requires further analysis as 
parliamentary engagement does not only reflect legal authorities and it is yet unclear 
whether this means actual influence on the government’s decision to the use of 
force. Born and Haenggi (2005) have asserted that parliamentary scrutiny in security 
policy should take three aspects into account: authorities, abilities, and attitudes. The 
three elements of authority, ability, and attitude are considered to be interlinked and 
equally important with regards to parliamentary scrutiny (Born and Haeggi, 2005). 
Huff (2013) applied this ‘Triple A’ framework in the context of the CFSP and argued 
that too much attention has been paid to formal parliamentary scrutiny powers, and 
too little to the way in which these powers are applied in practice.  
 
2.5. Parliamentary Scrutiny over troop deployment 
Emerging from discussions on the ways in which national parliaments can actively 
participate in security policy, the function of parliamentary scrutiny over EU security 
policy has received broad attention. Parliamentary scrutiny over the decision-making 
process for CSDP-related matters is considered necessary to provide democratic 
accountability to the actions of the executive, and thereby reduce the democratic 
deficit. Holzacker (2008, p. 143) has stated that parliamentary scrutiny consists of 
ways to influence the executive, and is ‘the exercise of power by the legislative 
branch to control, influence, or monitor government decision- making.’ In terms of the 
scope of this thesis, an analysis of parliamentary scrutiny helps to identify the ways 
in which parliaments can involve themselves in security policy decision-making.  
	 34	
The core of this research is thus based on the legislative function of scrutiny. In the 
existing academic literature, the function of parliaments is often split into two 
categories: (a) control over the executive or holding the government to account; and 
(b) public consideration, or providing a platform where the preferences and 
expectations of national citizens can be represented. and Thus, the parliament can 
be considered a vital link between the public and the executive, as the acting agent 
of the public and the acting principal of executive (Auel, 2007). Parliaments fulfil 
several functions, some of which may be restricted at the supranational (EWU) level, 
as legislative activity mostly relates to national policy-making (Sprungk, 2003).  
 
Auel and Raunio (2011) also evaluated the role of political parties and EU issues in 
terms of electoral competition and found that, in particular, Eurosceptic public 
opinion may increase the likelihood of stronger legislative scrutiny of the executive in 
EU-related affairs (Raunio, 2005). It is the information gap which has generated 
specific research interest. Raunio and Hix (2000: 163) argue that, especially during 
the 1990s, parliaments developed mechanisms for holding the executive 
accountable with regards to EU policies. This development was caused by the wish 
of, in particular, the non-governing parties to address the ‘information gap’ between 
the executive and the legislature. A study of non-governing parties undertaken by 
Auel and Benz (2005) argues that the government and the opposition parties may 
have different incentives for scrutinising EU matters. The opposition party may be 
more active in compensating for the power asymmetry and the government party 
may have fewer intentions to question the will of their government.  
 
For parliaments to be able to scrutinise the governmental activities in a policy field 
which is of a ‘closed nature’, legislatures need staff expertise. Thus, parliaments 
consist of several committees which are equipped with expertise (Born and Haenggi, 
2005, p. 9). The Literature on the parliamentary actors involved in security policy 
often focuses on the two dominant committees that are relevant to security policy: 
the foreign affairs and the defence committees. In addition, in order to establish 
parliamentary powers of scrutiny, one must analyse the instruments available to 
parliamentary majorities, parliamentary minorities, and individual MPs (Dieterich, 
Hummel, and Marschall, 2008).  
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In the field of security policy, scholars argue that national parliaments are effective in 
their scrutiny of the executive, measured in terms of formal rights of participation 
(Auel, 2007), i.e., through a parliamentary prerogative. Dieterich, Hummel, and 
Marschall (2015), surveying the role of national parliaments in terms of parliamentary 
effectiveness commensurate with the extent of their prerogative war powers, argue 
that parliaments can effectively limit the executive’s room to manoeuvre when the 
public disputes the deployment of military troops. While legislative influence through 
the parliamentary prerogative may be more transparent because regulated by law, 
far less obvious informal factors may also be at work.  
 
There is a range of different functions that are typically known to be undertaken by 
parliaments, such as elections: the parliament elects and dismisses the government. 
Another function is the legislative one, the main democratic task of the parliament, 
originally based on its budgetary powers. The essence of this function is law making, 
which is reflected in the German word for parliament, Gesetzgeber (lawmaker) (Blum 
& Schubert, 2013). The distinction between making laws and giving laws is, 
however, an important distinction to consider when analysing the parliament as an 
institution as well as the separation-of-powers arrangement (Blum & Schubert, 
2013). There is, however, no common definition of the parliamentary functions. 
 
In the literature on EU integration and foreign and security policy, scholars often use 
the terms ‘oversight’, ‘accountability’, ‘control’, and ‘scrutiny’ to describe 
parliamentary activities. There are no clear distinctions between these terms, and 
their meanings may overlap. Bajtay (2015) defines the parliamentary function of 
‘oversight’ as the activities that serve to evaluate policy implementation. Wouters and 
Raube (2012) describe ‘accountability’ as holding the executive ‘accountable for 
policy decisions and policy implementation…. parliaments can go as far as 
sanctioning them…by turning down their decisions’ (p. 150). Parliamentary ‘control’, 
again according to Wouters and Raube (2012), ‘entails the power to sanction and 
become decisive actors determining final policy outputs’ (p. 150); while Holzhacker 
(2002) defines it as ‘the exercise of power by the legislative branch to control, 
influence, or monitor government decision-making’ (p. 4).  
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Formal legal arrangements are required to fully exercise parliamentary control, such 
as a parliament’s prerogative to approve deployment of military troops (Wouters & 
Raube, 2012, p. 150). Parliamentary ‘control’ can be classified as either ex ante 
control or ex post control (de Wilde, 2009). Ex ante control gives the parliament the 
opportunity to control the executive’s performance before a final decision is made, 
while an ex post control arrangement can hold the executive accountable only in 
retrospect. Parliaments may exercise control through the parliamentary prerogative 
prior to the deployment of military troops, but cannot amend such a proposal once 
initiated by the executive. Despite the fact that decisions to authorise deployment of 
military troops are made on the national level, the ultimate decision to launch 
missions is made at the supranational (EU) level (Comelli, 2011).  
 
Parliamentary ‘scrutiny’ is a key aspect of national security policy, on a par with 
parliamentary control, though not at the level of individual policy-making (Wouters & 
Raube, 2012). In some security policy research, much interest has been shown in 
the processes of parliamentary control (Auel, 2007; Peters, Wagner & Deitelhoff, 
2008) and parliamentary scrutiny (Sprungk, 2010; Huff, 2013), particularly over 
missions within the CSDP (Peters, Wagner & Deitelhoff, 2008; Wouters & Raube, 
2012). Parliamentary ‘scrutiny’ is seen as offering a broader scope for parliamentary 
participation, while parliamentary ‘control’ exercises parliamentary participation 
mainly through the legislative function, based on the legal mechanisms of the 
parliamentary prerogative. For purposes of this study, such a function may be too 
limited. Whereas parliamentary control often focuses on the legal aspects of formal 
parliamentary procedure, scrutiny focuses on the ability and willingness of 
parliamentarians to get personally involved. The point here is that the parliament is 
informed. Parliaments may seek formal or informal ways to exercise scrutiny power. 
Parliamentary scrutiny in the area of security and defence policy may occur even 
though there is no formal mechanism at hand (Wouters and Raube, 2012). One 
problem that may arise in executing parliamentary scrutiny is that decisions on the 
intra-governmental level are made by the executive, which may deprive a parliament 
of sufficient time and information to conduct effective scrutiny of proposed military 
missions (Huff, 2013).  
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How can parliamentary scrutiny be measured? Assessing the effectiveness of 
parliamentary provisions in EU affairs is challenging, as there is no established 
framework or ‘uniform model’ (Maurer and Wessels, 2001). As scholars have been 
increasingly interested in measuring parliamentary effectiveness in EU affairs, there 
is still a debate as to whether parliaments play an effective role in EU policymaking 
at all or whether their role is simply ‘symbolic’ (Auel, 2007, p. 487). Despite the large 
amount of literature on the importance of national parliaments holding their 
executives accountable, only a miniscule portion thereof has investigated how 
parliaments can have an impact (Sprungk, 2010). An effective national parliamentary 
participation in the scrutiny process may affect not only the national but also the 
supranational (EU) level. Auel (2007) argues that, if parliaments were able to 
increase their role of scrutiny of the executive in EU affairs, that might decrease the 
overall effectiveness of EU policymaking, as parliamentary involvement might then 
result in a prolonged EU decision-making process overall.  
 
Gay and Winetrobe (2003, p. 26) conceptualise parliamentary effectiveness as 
‘public legitimacy and approval’ and refer to the fact that measurement of 
parliamentary activities generally relies ‘on public opinion surveys, voter turnout, 
public participation in parliamentary activities and so on’. Parliamentary effectiveness 
can be measured from an ‘internal perspective’, referring rather to the process than 
the outcome (Gay and Winetrobe, 2003). Parliamentary effectiveness may also be 
measured with regard to the outcome, i.e., the extent to which the executive is likely 
to be influenced by parliamentary actions (Gay and Winetrobe, 2003). For measuring 
parliamentary effectiveness, Gay and Winetrobe (2003) suggest the following 
indicators: (a) a list of all of the functions of the parliament; (b) a list of the 
procedures used to discharge these functions; (c) criteria for assessing the 
effectiveness of each procedure; and (d) a single performance indicator for each 
criterion. With regards to the first indicator, this research has already established in 
the previous section that the function of parliamentary scrutiny is the most suitable 
and is sufficient for the scope of this research. Thomas (2007) established indicators, 
referring to the Canadian Parliament, who analysed the number of government bills 
at the committee stage before the second reading and the total number of bills 
amended by the committees to establish the effectiveness of a minority parliament 
(p. 23). While both sets of indicators may be suitable for measuring general 
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parliamentary effectiveness, the area of security policy may require a different set of 
indicators. This is due to the ‘special nature’ of foreign and security policy as it has 
different procedures than domestic politics with a high level of secrecy to protect 
national security and the access to information to exercise successful scrutiny over 
the executive (Rosen, 2014).  
 
2.6. Research Design 
As this chapter outlines, there are many theoretical discussions on the role of 
national parliaments in EU security policy and in security security structures in 
existing literature. These discussions, though, seem to fail to define the role of 
parliaments and whether parliaments are able to shape security policy. As a result, 
the best fit for the scope of this research and to answer the research questions is the 
framework developed by Born and Haenggi (2005) which the scholars applied in 
their research to three criteria: authority, ability an attitude.  
Born and Haenggi (2005) argue that the parliamentary prerogative is important, but 
so is the right amount of information, and that the willingness of parliamentarians to 
engage in security policy is important for the parliament to be effective in both its 
scrutiny and control of the executive. In addition, Maurer and Wessels (2001) argue 
that the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny also depends on the available 
resources, such as trained staff and experts. As there is no formal assessment (in 
the current literature) of parliamentary effectiveness in its scrutiny of the executive in 
CSDP-related affairs, the following criteria will serve as the basis for this dissertation.  
 
The formal institutional power to participate in security affairs alone may not 
guarantee successful parliamentary scrutiny. The literature on national parliaments 
in the EU has indicated that there is a significant difference between the ability and 
willingness of parliamentarians to apply their formal rights (Maurer and Wessels, 
2001; Auel and Benz, 2005; Sprungk, 2010; Huff, 2015; Maatsch and Galella, 2016). 
However, there are challenges to measuring parliamentarians’ attitudes or the will to 
participate because this requires an extensive analysis of political dynamics (Born 
and Haenggi, 2005). Moreover, attitudes should be analysed within the context of the 
parliament’s general perception of the executive-legislature relationship (Huff, 2013). 
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According to Born and Haenggi (2005), successful parliamentary influence on CSDP 
depends upon the following three mechanisms:  
(a) parliaments should have the legal authority to participate in security policy 
(such as through the parliamentary prerogative prior to troop deployment), 
based on basic laws and/or constitutions;  
(b) parliaments should have the ability to fulfil their roles effectively by having 
access to sufficient resources and information; and  
(c) parliamentarians should have the right attitude.  
 
The Authority, Ability and Attitude Triad Framework 
 
In order to evaluate whether parliaments may be able to influence and scrutinise 
aspects decided under the CSDP umbrella, parliaments require ‘effective 
procedures, sufficient resources and the political will’ (Huff, 2013). Or as defined by 
(Finaud, 2011:10):  
Parliaments need the necessary constitutional authority to effectively oversee and influence 
governments in the area of security policy. They also need the necessary know-how as well 
as the political will to fulfil their roles and live up to their responsibilities. 
 
The three elements of authority, ability and attitude are considered to be interlinked 
and equally important in regards to parliamentary scrutiny (Born and Haeggi, 2005). 
Scholarly literature, however, often focuses on the first aspect authority alone 
regarding parliamentary scrutiny of the CSDP, often called parliamentary ‘war 
powers’ (Peters and Wagner, 2011; Wagner at el, 2010; Anghel et al, 2008). Such 
literature is often very detailed in a comparative format between the different EU 
member states’ parliaments and their strengths and weaknesses measured on 
whether they have the legislative authority to approve military troop deployment. The 
missing link to get a better assessment of parliamentary scrutiny in those 
comparisons are the aspects of ability and attitude. Dieterich et al. (2010, 2008) 
established a comparative study among 25 national parliaments and strengthening 
parliamentary war powers that include both elements of authority and the ability to 
control using tools such as interrogations and questions time. The focus on attitude 
or willingness of parliamentarians in exercising scrutiny is not only on the formal but 
also on the informal parliamentary channels. The influence of informal channels on 
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transnational level is subject to studies on specific CSDP missions (Peters et al., 
2014) and on inter-parliamentary cooperation.  
 
Authority refers to the formal right given to parliaments in the area of security policy 
of approval prior troop deployment and planning military budget. The right to approve 
or reject the government’s proposal for troop deployment is the strongest asset to 
parliamentary oversight (Born and Haenggi, 2005). Born and Haenggi further argue 
that especially the right to prior authorisation of the use of force is a key facet as it 
may be difficult to withdraw troop from a mission once deployed which may put the 
success of a mission at risk and may harm the credibility of the country. Born and 
Haenggi (2005) established four models regarding parliamentary involvement in 
troop deployment and examines the German Bundestag as a ‘strong’ parliament, 
belonging to group that has the right or prior authorisation of military troop 
deployment. While the aspect of authority forms a key part in effective parliamentary 
scrutiny, parliaments also need the ability and the attitude to get involved in this 
process. Parliaments, therefore, ought to have certain resources that allows to 
increase effective scrutiny. Additionally, parliamentarians ought to get engaged in 
exercising their authority and resources (Wagner et al., 2010).  
 
The concepts of ability and attitude have been subject to limited research (Huff, 
2015). Yet, whereas formal powers form a key feature, the factors of 
parliamentarians’ abilities and attitudes may essentially adjust the scrutiny process 
(Maatsch and Galella, 2016). To fully utilise the opportunities given to parliaments to 
scrutinise the executive, parliamentarians ought to have the ability (resources), that 
is, adequate resources and the possibility to increase their own knowledge (Born and 
Haenggi, 2005). The Treaty of Lisbon provides national parliaments with direct 
access to a large amount of EU documentation, which is likely to increase the role of 
parliamentary administrators in organising the flow of documents, selecting policy 
proposals for scrutiny, and providing MPs with a necessary proposal analysis. For 
parliaments to be able to scrutinise the governmental activities in a policy field that is 
of ‘closed nature’, legislatures consist of several committees that are equipped with 
personnel expertise.  (Born and Haenggi, 2005:9).  
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The picture of parliamentary scrutiny may not be complete by solely looking at 
parliamentary authority and parliamentarian expertise, it is equally important to 
consider the political attitude (willingness) of parliamentarians and the tools 
available to them in the process of parliamentary scrutiny (Born and Haenggi, 2005). 
Scholars have looked beyond parliament’s role as a unitary actor (Sprungk, 2016). 
As parliaments cannot be seen as unitary actors, scholars have investigated the 
roles of party politics and public opinion in security policy (Kaarbo and Kenealy, 
2016). Scholars have also examined the role of parliamentary administrators and 
their importance in EU affairs (Hoegenauer and Neuhold, 2013; Neuhold and 
Dobbels, 2015). Parliamentary staff play an important role in the scrutiny of EU 
affairs (Hoegenauer and Neuhold, 2013).   
 
The UK House of Lords’ report on the role of national parliaments in the European 
Union (2014:5) suggests that ‘Treaty change is not necessary to enhance the role of 
national parliaments in the EU. More than anything else, this is a matter for the will of 
parliamentarians’. The willingness of parliamentarians may be influenced by the 
executive, the media, public opinion and certain aspects in the proposal for a 
planned military mission abroad (Born and Haenggi, 2005). Despite the fact that MPs 
can influence the scrutiny process, the ultimate decisions are made by MPs, for 
instance, in the plenary (Hoegenauer and Neuhold, 2013).  
 
An Explorative Case Study Approach 
Applying a case study design has become an essential part of social science 
research (Yin, 2012) and has a number of advantages. One is that it enables the 
researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of a topic: for example, a case study 
investigates a phenomenon within a given context, even if the boundaries are not 
obvious (Yin, 2009). Another advantage is that it can have many different forms and 
still be flexible enough to suit many variations, such as using a qualitative or a 
quantitative approach, and investigating a single case or multiple cases (Cavaye, 
1996). Although the case study approach is highly reliable when carefully 
implemented (Tellis, 1997), it has its limitations as an applied method because a 
single case exploration may challenge the aim of reaching a general conclusion 
(Tellis, 1997). Yin (1984, p. 23) defines the case study research method as ‘an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
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context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’. Thus, a single case 
study is the preferred method for this study to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
role of the German Bundestag’s role in the CSDP framework. 
 
The exploratory case study approach is suitable for the scope of this thesis because 
a qualitative researcher can thereby examine the behaviour of members of the 
Bundestag more accurately. A descriptive case study design would limit this study to 
purely describing phenomena concerning the role of national parliaments through 
charts and rankings, such as for parliamentary prerogatives and early decision-
making. While this would help to understand the overall role of national parliaments 
in security affairs, mainly from a legal standpoint, it would not provide much of an 
explanation about the other ways in which parliaments can get involved (e.g,, the 
personal motivations of parliamentarians). An explanatory case study is also not 
suitable because this study does not seek to explain the cause of the phenomena 
(e.g., why national parliaments have a limited say) (see Table 1.2). 
 
Table 2.3.: Types of research design (Source: Blanche, Durrheim and Painter, 2006, pp. 44-45) 
 
Exploratory  Exploratory approach allows a preliminary investigation into relatively 
unknown areas of research: 
The literature assesses the role of national parliaments in security affairs as 
relatively marginal. Thus, an exploratory study seeks to establish the ways in which 
the Bundestag can activate various mechanisms to enhance parliamentary 
involvement. Its aim is to establish whether such mechanisms offer new techniques 
to actively open new channels for parliamentary involvement in the executive-led 
domain of security policy. 
Descriptive  A descriptive approach helps to describe a phenomenon accurately through 
narrative-type description and classification: 
To describe the role of national parliaments in security affairs (e.g., strong/weak 
parliamentary involvement through parliamentary prerogatives and early decision-
making); see Dieterich, Hummel and Marschall, 2008). 
Explanatory An explanatory approach provides a causal explanation of a phenomenon (e.g., 
Why is the role of national parliaments relatively marginal)?  
 
According to Yin (2009), case studies are often not very thorough and ‘too many 
times, the case study investigator has been sloppy, and has allowed equivocal 
evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings and conclusions’ 
(2009, p. 14). Yin also argues that a case study offers a limited foundation for 
generalisation and prompts the question, ‘How can you generalise from a single 
case?’ (Yin, 2009, p. 15) While this may be a valid question, this study does not aim 
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to generalise about whether national parliaments play a role in security affairs, 
because this issue has already been discussed in the scholarly literature; it rather 
aims to stimulate a discussion about the different ways in which parliaments can 
contribute to this policy area. The particular objective is to analyse the German case, 
which cannot only contribute to parliamentary literature and EU integration literature 
in general, but also enrich the literature studying German security policy. 
 
Research Methods  
Crotty (1998) defined research methods as ‘the techniques or procedures used to 
gather and analyse data related to some research question or hypothesis’ (p. 3). The 
choice of methods arises from the nature of the research to help to answer the 
research question. Research often begins with a document analysis, which is based 
on primary and secondary data and a literature review to set the stage for the 
subsequent investigation. This section also includes the justification for the chosen 
longitudinal method of process-tracing and data triangulation to ensure the validity 
and reliability of the collected data. 
 
Document Analysis 
For the purpose of this study, document analysis is ideal as it gives an opportunity to 
analyse information contained in documents such as reports and the plenary 
protocols of the Bundestag. These protocols are easily accessible via the Bundestag 
online database, which allows the researcher to obtain publicly available web video 
documentation of plenary sessions. 
 
Information and evidence about parliamentary scrutiny is gathered from numerous 
sources, including parliamentary plenary debates, EU regulations, and national 
constitutional acts, such as The ‘Armed Forces Decision’ by the FCC. The collected 
information is analysed using process-tracing, a method of examining the ‘sequential 
processes within a particular historical case’ (Georg & Bennett, 2005, p. 13). In 
particular, investigations over a longer period of time are in line with the method of 
process-tracing, which uses a longitudinal research approach in which the data 
involved are based on sequences of events that are drawn from a single unit 
(Waldner, 2012).  
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Document analysis is a method that is regularly applied in case study approaches, 
and therefore plays a key role in the data collection for this research. The analysis of 
documents is often the first step in undertaking research because it provides insight 
into and a first impression of the phenomena being researched. Dencombe (2003) 
identified factors as to why official documents are key sources: they include official 
data and statistics, which guarantees that the sources of information have been 
authorised and published by the state authorities; this means they have been 
checked for credibility, which means official documents can be considered ‘objective’ 
and ‘impartial.’ (pp. 227-228). Choosing the analysis of documents as part of a 
research investigation has several advantages. 
 
Denscombe (2003) identifies several advantages of documentary research (pp. 244-
245). First, there is the issue of accessibility: ‘to get hold of the material the 
researcher needs only to visit the library or go online via a home computer.’ 
Bundestag documents such as plenary protocols are all available to the public via 
the Internet. One challenge, however, is when the sources are considered secret. 
When sensitive data and documents are considered to be secret, the owner of the 
information may deny access, such as when the executive branch of government 
chooses to keep certain data confidential ‘in the national interest’ (Denscombe, 
2003, p. 232). Another advantage of document analysis is the low expense; whereas 
conducting interviews may entail high travel costs, large-scale data provided by 
documents can be accessed via the Internet or at a library.  
 
While there are many advantages to document analysis, Denscombe (2003) further 
argues that it also has a number of disadvantages, such as the credibility of the 
sources (pp. 244-245). The researcher needs to carefully evaluate the authority of 
sources, especially when data and documents are downloaded from the Internet. 
The Internet provides a platform with few restrictions to and control over the 
publication of sources, so any form of data or documents that are used for academic 
research should be evaluated with care and diligence, as regards their authenticity 
and credibility (Denscombe, 2003). Denscombe (2003) suggests four criteria that 
help the researcher to make a decision as to whether relevant sources are credible: 
(a) the authoritativeness of the site, such as a university or government website; (b) 
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the trustworthiness of the site; (c) how up-to-date the site is; and (d) the popularity of 
the site (p. 234).  
 
Important data, such as legislative documents which record plenary debates are 
provided on the Bundestag website, making it possible to trace the plenary sessions 
and look at occasions where German MPs may have influenced the legislative 
decision-making process, and consequently, the outcome on whether or not military 
troops are deployed. The discussions of the executive- legislative relations are 
concerned with the relationship between veto players and non- veto players, i.e. the 
governing parties and the opposition. In order to analyse whether the German 
Bundestag has an influence in the executive- legislative relations, the methods 
applied include several plenary debates in the German Bundestag on the two 
chosen missions, NAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia. A special focus is paid to 
the opposition parties during the debates to establish to what extent the Bundestag 
uses its ability to scrutinise the executive by raising questions and requesting 
information on the planning process of the chosen missions.  
 
Secondary sources for the document analysis conducted in this study include 
(among others) German foreign and security policies, literature on the CSDP, and 
the German policies towards this framework, as well as research on the selected 
CSDP missions. The starting point of the thesis is a thorough review of the literature, 
looking at the available information and data from books and academic journals to 
allow an initial overview of German foreign policy literature, EU integration literature 
and EU security literature, which was then extended to legislative reports. Of 
particular interest are studies on the role of national parliaments in EU affairs and 
security policy matters, and the oversight functions of national parliaments. The 
secondary data, such as press releases and Internet sources, can be obtained 
through the Bundestag’s home page. Further information was also gained from the 
writings of academic and policy observers, in the form of research papers by think 
tanks such as the German Konrad- Adenauer-Stiftung, an institute that focuses in 






This thesis applies process- tracing to explore to what extent the German Bundestag 
can influence missions under the CSDP framework. A longitudinal analysis of 
chronological sequences fits best for this type of research. This is because process- 
tracing allows an examination of the decision- making process and the development 
of the German institutional structure that influence the decision- making process 
such as the Constitutional Court’s decision in 1994 and the ruling of the 
Parliamentary Participation Act in 2005, followed by an examination of the role of the 
German Bundestag in the decision- making process to deploy troops abroad in the 
selected missions of this study.  
 
Unlike studies that apply statistical analysis and focus on correlations of data across 
cases, process-tracing is not just ‘another means of increasing the number of 
observable implications of a theory’; rather, it examines the ‘sequential processes 
within a particular historical case’ (Georg & Bennett, 2005, p. 13). Process-tracing is 
a method that allows the researcher to pinpoint the chain of events in a ‘theoretically 
informed way’ (Checkel, 2006, p. 363), and it shows how ideas inform certain actors 
because it enables the researcher to use different sources such as ‘historical 
memoirs, interviews, press accounts and documents’ (Checkel, 2005, p. 6) and to 
organise the collected empirical data in a systematic way. As Checkel (2005) points 
out, process-tracing has a strong focus on inquiries that are based on ‘how’ and 
‘interactions’ (p. 6), and therefore is suitable for a piece of research that is looking at 
the different actors that interrelate on a number of levels to generate a positive 
outcome. Process-tracing is thus well-suited to a study on EU integration and 
security affairs that is based on different levels and actors; it allows the researcher to 
pinpoint events and ‘trace the process in a very specific, theoretically informed way’ 
(Checkel, 2006, p. 363).  
 
A number of definitions of process-tracing have been put forward. According to 
Collier (2011), it is the ‘systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and 
analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator’ (p. 
823). Process-tracing aims to trace the relations between ‘possible causes and 
observed outcomes’ (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 6), and, by doing so, the 
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investigator can enhance knowledge of the relationship between different aspects. 
Process-tracing differs from the narrative and storytelling approach in three ways: 
 
First, process tracing is focused. It deals selectively with only certain aspects of the 
phenomenon. Hence, the investigator is aware that some information is lost along with some 
of the unique characteristics of the phenomenon. Second, process tracing is structured in the 
sense that the investigator is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical 
framework identified in the research design. Third, the goal of process tracing is ultimately to 
provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a specific outcome. (Vennesson, 
2008, p. 235) 
 
Despite the fact that process-tracing is popular among scholars for studying causal 
mechanisms and that it is an ‘invaluable method that should be included in every 
researcher’s repertoire’ (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 224), it does have its limitations. 
One such limitation is that it ‘can require enormous amounts of information’ (George 
& Bennett, 2005, p. 223) that can cause ‘data overload’; this is when such a large 
amount of data has been collected that it can lead to the researcher losing sight of 
the research context and requires making decisions about ‘what would count and 
what would not’ (Dunn, 2006, p. 375). Researchers, therefore, should carefully 
evaluate ‘financial limits and temporal constraints’ (Checkel, 2006, p. 367). A number 
of different methods can show the researcher what data are missing and ‘how much 
data is enough’ (Checkel, 2006, p. 366). 
 
Data Validity, Data Reliability, and Triangulation 
A challenge of using more than one method and research strategy is that the 
researcher has to carefully ensure the validity and reliability of the collected data. 
Validity can be divided into internal and external aspects. Winter (2000) defined 
internal validity as when the findings of an investigation are related to the 
phenomenon that is under investigation, whereas external validity concerns the 
extent to which the findings of the investigation can be generalised. Therefore, to 
strengthen validity, the research findings need to be examined from a number of 
angles, including double-checking interview transcripts to ensure the collected data 
is as accurate as possible. The reliability of the findings is extremely important in 
research, and this depends on the ‘likely recurrence of the original data and the way 
they are interpreted’ (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p. 271).  
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The method of triangulation, which is done in the ‘phase of data collection’ (Flick, 
2014, p. 12), helps to ensure validity and reliability, especially when data are 
collected using more than one method. Webb et al. (1966) has stated that the ‘most 
persuasive evidence comes through a triangulation of measurement processes’ (p. 
3). The purpose of triangulation is not only to cross-validate the collected data, but 
also to broaden the researcher’s understanding (Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012). Thus, 
applying this method allows the researcher to understand the phenomenon in 
question in more depth. In the social sciences in particular, it may be more 
challenging to make a precise prediction than in hard sciences because social 
scientists observe and understand through ideas and theories (Yeasmin & Rahman, 
2012). Research in the social sciences involving human behaviour is challenging 
because ‘various elements influence and change the social phenomena and most of 
the time, those cannot be measured microscopically’ (Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012, p. 
155).  
 
2.7. Conclusion: Room for parliamentary scrutiny on CSDP decisions? 
The chapter has examined the opportunities and challenges of parliamentary 
scrutiny of the CSDP. First, the various discussions on the role of national 
parliaments were outlined and analysed. The chapter has shown that the most 
suitable theoretical discussion to answer the research question and to discover 
whether national parliaments are able to influence the decision- making process is 
by the de- and reparliamentarisation thesis which include discussions around the 
loss of parliamentary power and the reparliamentarisation, thus regaining 
parliamentary strength to get involved in EU security affairs. The discussions 
outlined in this chapter are of rather theoretical nature, thus Chapter 4 will put theory 
into practice by by analysing the parliamentary scrutiny involvement in the CSDP 
mission NAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia. This chapter has also outlined the 






Chapter 3: The German Bundestag’s Position on Deciding to Send 
Troops Abroad 
The parliamentary prerogative is indeed a special German characteristic; this special characteristic 
has proved itself. Today it is part of our legal culture. It remains the case: The Bundeswehr is and will 







Parliament’s prerogative (Parliamentsvorbehalt) has been described as the ‘holy grail’ of German 
politics and symbolises the redemption of German from a dark past. In that sense, a rational 
calculation of whether this prerogative is conducive to effective defence policies seems almost 
irrelevant: it is part and parcel of  
German’s post- war political culture 
          (Drent, 2014, p. 12) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
German security policy changed during the Cold War period and again during the 
German re-unification of 1990, which entailed a transformation of the use of German 
armed forces (Bundeswehr) from a Verteidigungsarmee (defence army) to an Armee 
im Einsatz (army in action). This transformation, however, has not changed the fact 
that the German Bundestag has the right to prior approval, based on the 2005 
Parliamentary Participation Act.  
 
Von Bredow (2015) argues that one cannot imagine that the approval of the German 
Bundestag for an armed deployment abroad of the Bundeswehr—at least in 
response to danger of a certain size and a recognizable degree in terms of soldiers 
deployed—is an easy matter, either for the parliament or for the executive. This is 
because the Yes or No to participation in a multinational mission always has 
numerous consequences of a politico-diplomatic, security, and often vitally economic 
nature. The traditional conception of the state requires that the executive have far-
reaching scope in foreign policy. The Federal Constitutional Court, ensures, by 
regulation, that the parameters of the mission fit the executive’s area of authority. 
Such limitations are justified by the realistic assumption that, typically, only such a 
permanent political institution as the government has adequate human, material, and 
organizational resources to respond swiftly and appropriately to changing external 
																																																						
6
Originall text: Dieser Parlamentsvorbehalt ist in der Tat eine deutsche Besonderheit, aber diese 
Besonderheit hat sich bewaehrt. Sie ist heute Bestandteil unserer Rechtskultur. Es bleibt dabei: Die 
Bundeswehr ist und wird ein Parlamentsheer sein (Author’s own translation) 
7
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situations and thus fulfil the state's task of responsibly managing foreign affairs in the 
best possible way (BVerfGE 68, 1 [87]).  
 
The PPA grants the Bundestag several avenues of influence, which will be evaluated 
in this chapter. Thus, this chapter will set the stage by outlining the historical steps 
introducing the parliamentary prerogative, including its legal regulations. It will then 
discuss the executive-legislative relations in the deployment of German armed forces 
before proceeding to discuss the parliamentary prerogative in situations of 
multilateral cooperation, rapid deployment, and partnership between Germany and 
its European security partners, France and Britain (the ‘Big Three’).  
 
3.2. Historic Background- From the defense army to an army in action  
Keeping in mind the general constitutional climate in Germany since the Holocaust and World War II, 
one can be hardly surprised to hear that the deployment of the military requires a consenting vote of 




The main purpose of the German Bundeswehr is the national defence in the sense 
of territorial defence, as spelled out the in the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (Basic Law [Constitution] for the Federal Republic of Germany): Der 
Bund stellt die Streitkraefte zur Verteidigung auf (The federal government sets up the 
armed forces for defence). Yet, since the legal rulings/regulations of 1994 and 2005 
to grant the legislature with the parliamentary prerogative, the Bundestag has the 
‘upper hand’ by virtue of its active say and its right to approve or disapprove the 
executive’s mandates to deploy the Bundeswehr abroad.  
 
Before the PPA was enacted, the German armed forces were engaged solely in 
territorial defence and in non-armed actions in emergency relief. During this time, 
Germany was regarded as a ‘Civilian Power’ (Maull, 1990), the German armed 
forces having faced restrictions on the use of force after the Second World War and 
during the Cold War, which shaped German security policy in terms of how and 
when to use military force. German reunification, together with the increasing 
distance in time from the Second World War, came to pose a rather significant 






used only for defence of NATO territory. Germany’s Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder 
(he served 1998- 2005), tactfully but resolutely advocated a ‘normal’ role for the 
Federal Republic in world affairs. The year 1991 marked the first indirect 
participation in war operations, when the Bundeswehr engaged in the Iraq War. In 
1993, the Bundeswehr participated in the UN mission in Somalia for the first time in 
an armed war.  
 
The Federal Constitutional Court’s 1994 ruling9 established, in accordance with the 
Grundgesetz, that German troops are allowed to be deployed only after the 
Bundestag gives approval: ‘The Constitution obliges the Federal Government to 
seek enabling agreement by the German Bundestag, as a rule in advance, before 
committing the armed forces to action’ (BVerfGE 90, 286, July 12, 1994). This ruling, 
together with the PPA, has been described by Helms (2005) as legislative influence 
for the German Bundestag in security affairs despite the wide scope of the 
executive’s decision-making power in this policy area.   
 
The FCC ruling (BVerG, 1994) laid down the principle that the Bundeswehr functions 
as a ‘parliamentary army’ and that foreign assignments require parliamentary 
approval because they constitute a move from territorial defence to ‘wars of choices’ 
(Wagner et al., 2017). In its decision of 12 July 1994, the Court began to develop a 
legal framework to regulate different aspects of deploying Germany’s armed forces. 
The framework should uphold parliament’s right of approval but also sustain 
Germany´s ability to engage in multilateral cooperation. It was argued (Ziegler, 2007) 
that the legal basis for the deployment of the Bundeswehr for other than territorial 
defence served the purpose of integrating Germany into just such collective 
multilateral cooperation (see Art 24 (1) and (2) GG, which gives the authority for 
participating in such cooperation).  
 
The basic framework of the parliamentary participation procedure in concrete 
decisions on the deployment of German armed forces in a foreign deployment was 
																																																						
9
 For more information of the historical and political background on German security policy and the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling see Nolte, Georg (2003) Germany: ensuring political legitimacy for the 
use of military forces by requiring constitutional accountability. IN: KU & Jacobson, Democratic 
Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
	 52	
given by the Karlsruher judges in the Streitkraefteurteil (Armed Forces Decision, 
BVerfGE 90 286, 387 f):  
 
The Bundestag has to decide on the deployments of armed armed forces in accordance with 
Art. 42 (2) Basic Law… prepared in the relevant committees and discussed in plenary 




In March 2004, after 10 years of practice without any legal basis, the German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) and The Greens presented the draft of a parliamentary 
participation law, a law that was intended to regulate proceedures for the 
participation of the German Parliament in decisions on the armed deployment of 
German armed forces abroad. Since the 1994 FCC ruling, there was already a well-
established practice on deployment of the German armed forces. Nevertheless, 
according to Gernot Erler (SPD), it made sense to have a federal law with detailed, 
binding rules, to provide legal certaintyand guidance for all parties involved, 
because:  
 





Erler argued that, over time, certain aspects have become a bit blurry, for example, 
when the federal government had obtained the approval of the political groups in 
informal talks and it was not clear anymore as to whether the parliament still had to 
be heard and give a final approval.12 The law was adopted in December 2004. The 
‘law on Parliamentary participation in the decision on the use of armed forces 
abroad’ came into force on 25 March 2005, more than ten years after the 1994 
Armed Forces Decision until the formal participation of the Bundestag in such 
decisions was made concrete in the PPA.  
 
The literature on EU security policy has determined that public opinion on such 
political decisions is no longer debateable (von Krause, 2011). The German 









the decision- making process of troop deployment as parliamentarians are 
representatives of electoral districts (Jund & Daase, 2013).  Jund and Daase (2013) 
argue that public opinion can even become a ‘game-changer’ during electoral 
campaigns, ever since former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder publicly stated his 
concerns about the Iraq intervention in 2002 during the elections. This is because 
elections are seen as a tool to align politicians’ decisions with those of their 
constituents (Brettschneider, 1996).  
 
The fundamental judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court stands in 
incontrovertible contradiction to the functional logic of a parliamentary governmental 
system. In the functional logic of parliamentary government, the parliamentary 
majority is continuously part of government action. Between the parliamentary 
majority and the government there is a private political interest. Due to the 
institutional integration with the executive, the parliamentary majority does not show 
any pronounced inclination to direct the government it chooses, which means it 
withholds consent, which is an abdication of institutional integration between the two 
(Brummer & Froehlich, 2011). Marschall (2009) complains of a lack of clarity and a 
tendency to under-regulate the parliamentary participation law and points to the 
choice of words specifically the 'use of armed forces'. Marschall (2009) says that the 
law here does not go into detail, which opens up a wide range of interpretation and 
action for the government, and continues to argue that the ambiguity of the federal 
government can create facts that can influence the parliament's decision-making 
authority. 
 
In summary, while the primary goal of implementing the parliamentary prerogative 
was to have a ‘double check’ before deploying German armed forces abroad, the 
role of parliament has been strengthened by including the legislative branch in the 
decision-making process. Yet the discussions in the literature show that, despite the 
legislative prerogative, different stages in history, such as the new regulation of 
2005, show that the first concern has been that the role of the German armed forces 
be in line with multilateral cooperation, thus the argument whether the parliament 
could hinder multilateral cooperation may not be valid.  
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3.3. Legal Background of the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court and 
Its Developments 
The thesis will now analyse the role of the Bundestag in terms of legal regulations 
and how the regulations can help in order to exercise parliamentary influence over 
decisions on troop deployment. That is, which influential ways emerge on the 
deployment of military troops emerge in the context of the legal regulations of the 
parliamentary prerogative and whether the role of the legislature can be 
strengthened through the legal regulation. The focus is in particular on the 
interpellation rights, that is, the parliamentary procedure of demanding that the 
executive explains some act or policy, and other control instruments before the 
executive’s mandate to deploy troops as well as during ongoing missions and at the 
end of operations.  
 
According to the doppelter Schluessel (double key) principle (Wiefelspuetz, 2008 p. 
204), the German executive and legislative branches share the responsibility for 
military deployment. However, the right of initiative lies solely with the Federal 
Government as a whole. The government decides whether and to what extent 
military troops can be deployed abroad. The legal regulation § 3 (3) PBG states that 
the Bundestag can only approve or reject the executive’s proposal.  
 
The basic structure of the role of the German Bundestag procedure for concrete 
decisions on the deployment of armed Bundeswehr forces in a foreign mission was 
given by the Karlsruhe judges in the "Armed Forces Decision": 
The Bundestag has to decide on the use of armed forces in accordance with Art. 42 para. 2 
GG15. The importance of the decision to be taken… that it will be prepared in the relevant 




Since then, as a rule, the following standard procedure has been used in 
parliamentary practice. After the first consultation of the government bill in plenary, 
the application, which is available as a ‘Bundestag Printed Paper’ (BT-Drs), is 
subsequently sent to the committees. The parliamentary consultation process is co-
																																																						
13
 Bundesverfassungsgericht (1994) p. 388. Original text: Der Bundestag hat ueber Einsaetze 
bewaffneter Streitkraefte nach Massgabe des Art. 42 Abs. 2GG zu beschliessen. Der Bedeutung des 
zu fassenden Beschlusses wird es, so es die Lage irgend erlaubt, entsprechen, dass er in den 
zustaendigen Ausschuessen vorbereitet und im Plenum des Bundestages eroertert wird.  
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ordinated by the Foreign Affairs Committee, which, if required, collects the opinion of 
the other committees. On this basis, the Foreign Affairs Committee makes a decision 
and reports back to the plenary of the Bundestag. In the context of the second 
consultation, the parliamentary procedure will be called by a vote and, with a simple 
majority, decide whether the Bundeswehr—in accordance with the requirements of 
the executive’s mandate—will be deployed.14 The parliament is to be sent the 
mandate in ample time before the beginning of the mission and, according to § 3 (2) 
PBG, should contain the following information: the mission itself and the area 
involved, the legal foundation of the mission, the maximum number of soldiers 
deployed, the capabilities of the deployed forces, the planned duration of the 
mission, and the expected costs as well as the budget. The Bundestag can approve 
the request in full accordance with § 3 (3) PGB or reject it.  
 
For missions of low intensity and scope (geringer Intensitaet und Tragweite), a 
simplified approval procedure (vereinfaches Zustimmungsverfahren) is possible. 
Thus, according to § 4 (1) PBG, the consent of the Bundestag is granted if not within 
seven days of distribution of the executive’s proposal the Bundestag rejects the 
proposal. Another aspect is the subsequent approval (nachtraegliche Zustimmung) 
of the Bundestag in situations of danger (Gefahr in Verzug). In such cases, the prior 
consent of the Bundestag according to §5 (1) PBG can be set aside to secure 
Germany’s alliance capability. At the same time, it is demanded that the Bundestag 
in a suitable manner (geeigneter Weise, § 5 (2) PBG), prior to and during a mission, 
give the parliamentary approval subsequently. In § 6 (1) PBG, it is the executive’s 
duty to inform the Bundestag frequently about ongoing missions abroad, which also 
includes developments in the area of operations.  
 
Although the Parliamentary Participation Act allows the secrecy of the government 
when troops are deployed, there has been no instance in which the parliament has 
refused to approve a government bill nor prevented the Bundeswehr from 
participating in any number of campaigns. Thus, although the Bundestag has a right 
to veto decisions, there does not seem to be a general restraint on the part of the 
legislative in matters of armed conflict (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008, 
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 Ordentliches Zustimmungsverfahren (ordinary assent procedure)	
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p.187). The government has generally secured parliamentary approval of its actions 
by the involvement of the relevant parliamentary parties (the majority and the 
opposition) in preliminary decisions. This once again draws attention to the fact that 
the demarcation between the executive and the parliament in classical democracies 
seems rather flexible (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008, p.187). It is worth 
noting that the same Constitutional Court has granted the Bundestag the power of 
parliamentary reservation on troop deployments, while in its verdicts it still strongly 
adheres to the traditional understanding of the executive prerogative (Dieterich, 
Hummel, & Marschall, 2008). 
 
The Rueckholrecht enables the Bundestag to revoke its consent to any deployment 
of armed forces. Doerfler-Dierken & Portugall (2010) argue that this right provides 
the most powerful control instrument for the parliament in the executive-legislative 
relations. Doerfler-Dierken & Portugall (2010) further argue that should the 
Bundestag make use of the Rueckholrecht against the will of the executive, the 
executive and the leading party have no options that could cause severe 
consequences. Given these consequences, as well as the fact that the Federal 
Government is supported by the majority in parliament, it must be considered highly 
unlikely that the Bundestag would make use of this right. It should further be noted 
that this right should not be taken lightly, as the interests of multilateral partners 
should be coinsidered before withdrawing German armed forces during ongoing 
missions (Blumenthal & Broechler, 2009). The Rueckholrecht has been identified in 
literature as a powerful tool for the parliament to influence the decision-making 
process over sending troops abroad.  
 
The Bundestag’s right of information versus the executive’s Informationsvorsprung 
(information advantage) 
In order to provide partial parliamentary influence, the Bundestag has been granted 
a weekly Unterrichtung des Parlaments (informing the parliament) (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2006). The newly installed regulation entitles the German parliament’s 
MPs to receive the information of current German armed forces missions. Despite 
this right of information for the German Bundestag, the executive is well aware of the 
advantage in information flow and, on top of that, even makes use of it (Gareis, 
2010). One method of taking advantage is noticeable in the reports to the German 
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Bundestag committees that are often kept very plain and basic, and information has 
to be gathered through parliamentary requests (Gareis, 2010). 
 
Parliamentarians have different channels available to obtain information about the 
missions’ planning process. Peters, Wagner and Glahn (2014) identify that the 
executive frequently briefs the parliamentary defence committee, provides answers 
to questions posed by parliamentarians to the executive such as the numbers of 
participating armed troops. In case of the Atalanta mission, parliamentarians were 
able to inquire about the the mission first hand: German parliamentarians visited the 
armed forces on site in the mission’s headquarters in Djibouti (Peters, Wagner and 
Glahn, 2014).  
 
The literature on German security policy has discussed the role of the German 
Bundestag in security policy decisions. Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall (2008, 
p.183) argue that the highest German court has granted the Bundestag such a 
strong role that, by mere fiat, it can set such narrow limits on the government’s 
power to make decisions about foreign missions. With the ruling by the Federal 
Constitutional Court on the parliamentary prerogative, the Bundestag is now fully 
involved in the decision making-process on the deployment of military troops; thus, 
all decisions must be debated ‘substantially’ in the Bundestag (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
2006, p. 16), which makes the Bundestag the key platform for German security 
decisions. Even though the Bundestag is not the ultimate platform on which the 
decisions on troop deployment of German armed forces are made, as these 
decisions are made by the executive on the supranational level in the European 
Council among all member states’ executives, it is yet the forum in which decisions 
have to be explained, defended, and, most importantly, approved (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 
2006).  
 
The existing literature argues against a strong role for the parliament in terms of 
information content and argues that the executive has an ‘information advantage’ 
(Schmidt, Hellmann & Wolf, 2007). This is because of the mere fact that the 
decisions are ultimately made at the intergovernmental level, which is far away from 
the national parliaments. This is despite the fact that the German Bundestag has a 
general right to be informed vis-à-vis the Federal Government. 
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The exchange of information between the German executive and the legislature is 
important for successful cooperation in security policy. One of the main problems for 
parliamentary involvement is the fact that the executive generally has an advantage 
in the flow and scope of information process, known in scholarly literature as the as 
Informationsvorsprung (informational advantage) (Herzog, Rebenstorf and Wessels, 
1993; Marschall, 1999; Schwab, 1999; Kirschniok-Schmidt, 2010). Such advantage 
in information flow on EU developments makes it difficult for the German parliament 
to hold the executive accountable (Saalfeld, 2004).  
 
Adequate access to information is an essential prerequisite for the exercise of 
parliamentary scrutiny and symbolizes a decisive step on the effective participation 
of the Bundestag in EU affairs. Already in July 1957, the first law to ensure 
parliamentary participation was enacted. Articles 2 and 3 of the German Law of 
Ratification of the EEC Treaty, 25 July 1957, established the duty of the Federal 
Government to inform Parliament about any deliberation of the Council leading up to 
the adoption of community decisions directly applicable to Germany or which require 
the modification or the approval of domestic legislative measures (Martinez, 1996). 
Art. 23 GG establishes the general duty of the Federal government to inform the 
Bundestag in detail and at the earliest as possible: 
(2) In matters of the European Union the Bundestag and through the Federal Council the Federal 
States participate. The Federal Government shall inform the Bundestag and the Federal Council 




(3) The Federal Government gives the Bundestag an opportunity to comment before participating in 
legislative acts of the European Union. The Federal Government takes into account the opinion of the 




Thus, the legal provisions imply the requirement for the German executive to inform 
the German Bundestag on objectives that it intends to decide at the EU level.  
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 Own translation, original: In Angelegenheiten der Europaeischen Union wirken der Bundestag und 
durch den Bundesrat die Laender mit. Die Bundesregierung hat den Bundestag und den Bundesrat 
umfassend und zum fruehestmoeglichen Zeitpunkt zu unterrichten. 
16
 Own translation, original: Die Bundesregierung gibt dem Bundestag Gelegenheit zur 
Stellungnahme vor ihrer Mitwirkung an Rechtsetzungsakten der Europaeischen Union. Die 
Bundesregierung beruecksichtig die Stellungnahme des Bundestages bei den Verhandlungen. 
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The German parliament requires and has the right to be fully informed by the 
executive about their engagement in EU affairs. As discussed, the Basic Law 
requires the provision with a comprehensive information flow about every EU 
legislation process and as early as possible. The working process of such 
information flow is as follows: every ministerial department has to send every EU 
document according to their area of responsibility. The official documents that relate 
to the CSDP framework have to be passed on to the Foreign Office. The core 
responsibility of the European Affairs Committee is to send the documents to the 
related Committee that is in charge of observation (Comelli and Zanon, 2009).  To 
support the German Bundestag in the flow of information, it was granted the 
‘Unterrichtung des Parlaments’ which informs MPs in operations abroad. The 
executive makes effort to inform the Bundestag over missions: Die Bundesregierung 
sichert zu, den Deutschen Bundestag entsprechend bisheriger Praxis regelmaessig 
ueber Einsaetze auf der Grundlage dieses Mandats zu unterrichten17.  
 
Though the German Bundestag has the right to be informed theoretically, it does not 
mean that it is in practice. In previous military mission participation, for example, 
during the Operation Enduring Freedom, the German executive was accused of not 
informing the Bundestag on 05.12.2006:  The final update of the joint notification by 
the Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry of Defence on the participation of 
German armed forces dates back to the October 2005 and covers the period April 
until October 2005 to which the Federal government has not submitted any further 
information to the German Bundestag up to the present day . Thus, the federal 
government… broke a central commitment, the obligations to the German 
Bundestag roughly violated and the confidence shouted .   
 
The Bundestag also has the right to get a briefing frequently in order to inform it 
about current operations of the German armed forces. The executive is obligated to 
thus inform the parliament on a regular basis and to provide regular information 
about the ongoing missions abroad (§6 (1) PBG):  
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The Federal Government regularly informs the Bundestag about the process of operations 
and the development in the area of operation. 
 
Further, the ParlBG §3 (2) specifies the level of information that a mandate of the 
Federal Government must contain in order to allow the Parliament to make an 
informed decision (von Krause, 2015). 
 
The German Bundestag has the ability to influence the decision-making process in 
the setting up of the mandate in an exchange between parliamentarians and the 
executive, in which the latter has a general interest in finding out the overall opinion 
of the majority party in parliament, which normally attracts more interest than the 
parliamentary opposition (von Krause, 2013). In addition to increasing the 
transparency of operational decisions, parliamentary reservation serves above all to 
control government action by legislative power, without, however, eliminating the 
operational prerogative of the federal government in deploying the armed forces 
abroad (von Krause, 2011).  Von Krause (2013) also argues that, although the 
parliament's power is formally reduced to simple yes/no decisions, in parliamentary 
practice, however, there are various informal influences the Bundestag can have on 
the formulation of the government's mandate.  
 
The government and parliament have developed practical procedures for dealing 
with the parliamentary reservation on the basis of informal agreement. This 
exchange of information can be beneficial for both. On the one hand, this can also 
mean influence on the part of the Bundestag in the process of formulating the 
mandates through a close exchange of information with the executive; on the other 
hand, the government can recognize what its own parliamentary camp is ready to 
support, so that the information exchange is essentially limited to the coalition faction 
and the opposition is rather less involved. However, this leads to the situation that, 
especially in times of a large coalition, one part of parliament is very much restricted 
(von Krause, 2011). 
 
Thus, the parliament has the right to be fully informed about ongoing military 
missions, according to the Parliamentary Participation Act, which generally could 
strengthen the position of the legislature. Yet, the executive, according to the 
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literature, seems to have an information advantage, which causes an asymmetry in 
the decision-making process, resulting in an advantage for the executive.  
 
3.4. Challenges and opportunities of the Parliamentary Prerogative on the 
European level 
Though the current literature has argued that there is a role for the parliament to play 
in security matters, the current literature also identifies three key aspects that pose 
opportunities and challenges for legislative-executive relations:  
 
(a) Problems occurring in multilateral cooperation and a possible hindering of 
participation caused by the parliamentary prerogative. Does the parliamentary 
reservation affect the reliability of German security policy among its partners and 
allies?  
(b) Problems with the EU’s rapid deployment force (‘battlegroups’) when a national 
parliament requires a lengthy time to decide on participation. Does the commitment 
to first get the approval of the Bundestag lead to delays in the decision-making 
process?  




The German Bundeswehr is, in various ways, involved in multinational cooperation. 
Multilateral cooperation is a key element in building successful security capabilities 
for the EU. Germany was one of the key players in setting up the the CSDP, it 
prepared the Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on 
Security and Defence18, adopted in 1999. Yet is more active in participating in 
civilian missions and is seen to be rather reluctant to contribute to missions that are 
of military nature.  
 
In 2012, Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel stated that Germany would consider 
constitutional change for the benefit of an effective common EU security and defence 
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 Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions. Annex III. (online), Press: 0 Nr: 150/99. 
Available on http://ue.eu.int/en/info/eurocouncil/. 
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policy: 'even when it is difficult, we have to be prepared, as we have done in other 
policy areas, to incrementally give up sovereignty in the area of security and 
defence' (Drent, 2014, p. 13). The Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ, 2013) reported that 
the SPD insists that the parliamentary reservation remains compulsory for troop 
deployment. SPD president Sigmar Gabriel, however, stated in a speech at the 8th 
Petersberg Discussions on the Development of a Common European Security and 
Defence Policy, in Bonn, that Germany is ready to engage in a viable common policy 
with the associated ultimate objective of a European army, even if this means a 
change in the German constitution (SPD, 2012).   
 
Additionally, parliamentarians Schockenhoff and Kiesewetter (2012) agreed that 
although the Bundestag should continue to have the last say in troop deployment, it 
would be a clear signal of reliability towards partners if the decision-making system 
was more flexible. As a result, it can be argued that, by keeping the parliamentary 
prerogative, not only is German parliamentary involvement in EU security affairs 
relatively intense compared to that of other EU member states (Douglas, 2014), but 
the parliament’s role is also recognised at the national level. 
 
The fact that the parliament has to give approval for military troop deployment is not 
always an easy decision for the Bundestag to make, as Florian Hahn (CDU) argued 
in a Bundestag speech on 26 February 2015 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015b). Hahn 
further commented that this is also the case in the debate over the extension of the 
EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali mission. The legal requirements were given with 
the Council of the European Union decisions of February 2013 and April 2014. 
Germany approved the extension through the end of May 2016 and, to Hahn, 
Germany's acceptance of taking the lead in this mission will send a signal of trust to 
its European partners and to Mali (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015b).  
 
As Eckart von Klaeden aruged during a Bundestag debate: An alliance like NATO 
will only become so strong and the EU’s CFSP will only be so successful as its 
weakest member. Whoever, through their own domestic-decision requirements, 
makes the decision in the alliance more difficult, will weaken the alliance and 
perhaps force others to go their own way. Though it cannot be argued that the 
parliamentary prerogative hinders multilateral cooperation (to which Gernot Erler 
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(SPD) argues that many overlook that the normal parliamentary practice does not 
require more than three days), the first day the cabinet decision is made, on the 
following day the first reading, the transfer to the committees, and the deliberations 
in the committees take place; and already on the third day the parliament makes the 
decision. It is very important to know that. In the question of future multilateral 
operations, the following argument is to be considered: Within the time limits set by 
both the EU and by NATO, it is possible for the German Bundestag to hold on to the 
parliamentary prerogative without any cutbacks on participation in such joint 
operations. 
 
The right to influence the decision-making process is a form of ex post control, which 
means that even though the Bundestag has the right to veto decisions on German 
troop deployment, such decisions are made after the decision is made on the 
(supranational) European level. It thus raises the question, to what extent the 
German Bundestag can restrict multilateral cooperation. Though there may be some 
influence on the EU’s rapid-deployment force (‘battlegroups’), which form one part of 
the EU’s multilateral cooperation, this may be an area in which parliamentary 
participation can influence an efficient cooperation in which a quick decision-making 
process is vital.  
 
The parliamentary prerogative and the rapid-deployment  
The EU security policy literature discusses whether the parliamentary prerogative 
has an effect on rapid- deployment of military forces by the lengthy decision- making 
process when parliamentary approval is required (Wagner, 2006; Peters, Wagner 
and Deitelhoff, 2008, 2010). The battlegroups are the EU’s rapid-deployment force. 
The battlegroups aim to fulfil the purpose of providing the EU with a specific tool in 
the range of rapid-response capabilities, which contributes to making the EU more 
coherent, more active, and more capable.19 The report, issued by EU External Action 
in 2011, highlights the purpose of the battlegroups:  
Setting up a Battlegroup package is an opportunity for enhanced military cooperation 
between Member States. This improves mutual knowledge of each other’s capabilities with 







Yet, the report also highlights the need for a rapid decision-making process in the 
deployment of military troops: 
 
 …the concept emphasises the need for accelerated decision-making. Not only do the EU 
bodies need to be ready but the national decision-making processes need to be 
synchronized to meet the demanding timelines.  
 
Germany faces a fundamental conflict of interest in rapid crisis response efforts. The 
federal government enters into commitments for the battlegroups with political 
commitments to its international partners in the EU. However, before a concrete 
operation, the Bundestag must first agree to the posting of German contingents. The 
EU rapid- deployment are meant to be deployed within 5-10 days20. In the case of 
NAVFOR Atalanta, the German Bundestag approved participation on 19 December 
2008 which means 11 days after the mission was launched (Peters, Wagner and 
Glahn, 2014). As a result, the Bundestag and the Federal Government are caught in 
the tension between the appropriate speed of the decision-making process, their 
democratic-parliamentary legitimacy at the national level, and international 
obligations (Moelling, 2007).  
 
The concern was linked to the lengthy and time-consuming process, when decisions 
are not taken directly by the executive but rather when decisions have to pass 
several stages in parliament, that could possibly hinder alliance cooperation 
regarding the EU battlegroups within a common European security approach 
(Chappell, 2012) and could also lead to the perception that Germany is rather slow 
or unassertive in international affairs (Wuerzer, 2013). Germany has promised to 
supply the EU battlegroups with fixed units, which should be ready within five to 
seven days of a request. For such operations, decisions must be made within a very 
short time if the Federal Government wants to fulfill the German obligations within 
the framework of NATO and the EU (Noetzel and Scheer, 2007).  
 
Two aspects come to mind when discussing the role of the Bundestag and the 
prospect of battlegroup deployment:  
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 EU Council Secretariat (2006) Factsheet EU Battlegroups, EU BG 02 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/91611.pdf 
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(a) Decisions on whether to deploy the battlegroups are like any other decision in 
regard to the CSDP and subject to a unanimous decision by the Council. This means 
the German Bundestag would have to approve before this decision.  
(b) While there is the discussion that the German Bundestag could hinder the rapid 
deployment of the battlegroups, one needs to consider that the EU battlegroups so 
far have not been deployed. Since 2007, the battlegroups have been fully 
functioning, yet issues of political will, usability, and financial solidarity have 
prevented them from being employed so far (European External Action Service, 
2017).  Thus, a discussion as to whether the Bundestag could hinder cooperation is 
for now rather theoretical.  
 
In terms of a lengthy and time- consuming process, it is worth noticing that 
Germany’s close partners Britain and France do not have the legal requirement to 
bring decisions of troop deployment before parliament which may result in a possible 
conflict of interest when deploying troops as part of rapid deployment in multilateral 
operations. Britain and France have a strong executive component in troop 
deployment (il domaine réservé and the ‘royal prerogative’).  
 
Germany has always had a partnership with France and a strong connection to 
Britain. Both France and Britain are more focused and more active in participating in 
military missions than Germany, while neither Britain nor France are legally bound to 
a parliamentary prerogative. In Germany, the stringent parliamentary prerogative is 
essential in every deployment, whereas, in France, the executive is not required to 
be involved with the assemblée nationale in regard to military troop deployment 
abroad. The same applies to Britain: there is no constitutional requirement to obtain 
parliamentary approval; this is known as the ‘royal prerogative’, in which the decision 
to deploy military troops abroad lies in the hands of the prime minister. In order to 
avoid a possible hindrance in rapid- deployment and multilateral cooperation, a 
commission was set up to review the Bundestag’s ‘control rights’ in security policy, 
suggesting in the final report ways for restructuring such rights. (This will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section.)  
 
The commission for the review and safeguarding of parliamentary rights in troop 
deployment 
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To overcome the aforementioned three challenges to the German parliamentary 
prerogative, a commission was set up. Another fact that highlights the importance of 
parliamentary involvement in German security affairs was the formal revision of this 
prerogative to adapt to the changing security environment, in which rapid decision-
making is becoming increasingly more important for successful security cooperation.  
On 11 March, 2014, the German government asked for a revision of the Bundestag 
approval requirement, called the Kommission zur Ueberpruefung und Sicherung der 
Parlamentsrechte bei der Mandatierung von Auslandseinsaetzen der Bundeswehr 
(Commission for the Review and Safeguarding of Parliamentary Rights in the 
Mandate of Foreign Assignments of the German Armed Forces) (Haid, 2014). In 
2014, a coalition agreement between the Christian Democratic Union of Germany 
(CDU) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), driven by former 
Defence Minister Ruehe, was set up to investigate this issue (von Krause, 2015). 
The PPA remains in place, however. 
 
The Commission, led by former Minister of Defence Volker Ruehe, is to investigate 
whether this act still has a place in today's security international setting with a 
growing alliance security integration (Bundeswehr-Journal, 2013). Niels Annen 
(SPD) argued that the aim of this Commission should be to develop proposals on 
securing legislative rights for the Bundestag in the development of the EU integration 
process (Stuetzle, 2014). Overall, the task of the Commission was:  
 
…to examine how the parliamentary rights can be secured on the path of progressing 
Alliance integration despite the diversification of tasks. The aim of the Commission is to 
investigate the legal and political examination of a corresponding need for action for the 




Despite the concerns raised about the Parliamentary Participation Act and the 
Commission that was set up to review the Bundestag’s participation rights, the 
dispute is perhaps not rational, as, thus far, no approval has been declined by 
parliament to deploy military troops abroad. If Germany decides not to participate in 
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 Bundestag, Report of the commission on the review and safeguarding of parliamentary rights 
regarding mandates for bundeswehr missions abroad. Summary of proposals and recommendations 




multilateral military cooperation, it is a decision made by the German executive and 
not by the Bundestag. However, this does not mean that the discussion about the 
role of parliament is not important. Instead, the parliament’s internal voting behaviour 
may be partial, given that the parliamentary majority belongs to the same political 
party as the government and thus, would most likely support the government’s 
decision (Raube & Wouters, 2016). The Bundestag has not rejected any proposal 
initiated by the executive so far, with the political parties of the leading coalition in full 
support of the government. ‘While the prerogative is a powerful tool, it is rarely used 
to reject proposals. This does not mean that parliaments are passive takers of 
decisions, but rather that influence takes place less visibly in the process of 
legislative-executive interactions’ (Winzen, 2010).  
 
A new law was intended to implement the results of the Ruehe Commission (Zeit 
online, 2017). Certain training assignments, provided that they take place in a safe 
environment, should in future be possible without Parliament's mandate. The 
government should also be able to decide on the assignment of officers to EU and 
NATO international bodies in the future, provided that they are deployed outside 
combat zones. The Ruehe Commission further suggested that the information and 
control rights of the Bundestag should be strengthened through the exchange of 
information with the executive on the overall direction of military engagement.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the historical roots of the German Parliamentary 
Participation Act and its legal regulations. This was done in order to get an overall 
understanding of the possibilities that the Bundestag has to participate in the 
decision-making process on the deployment of troops. One aspect in particular was 
mentioned: the Bundestag’s right of information contrary to the information 
advantage of the executive, with the result that even the parliament is required to be 
informed about ongoing missions, the executive having an advantage, as the 
ultimate decision on CSDP operations is made on the supranational level. This 
chapter also looked at the challenges that could arise within multilateral cooperation, 
in the EU rapid deployment battlegroups, and within security cooperation among 
Germany’s security partners, France and Britain, with the result that the 
Parliamentary Prerogative does not seem to be an obstacle per se.  
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Chapter 4 - The German Bundestag - scrutinising decisions on 
the CSDP operations NAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia?  
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Having discussed the theoretical aspects of the role of national parliaments in EU 
security policy in Chapter 2, this chapter puts theory into practice. As in Chapter 3 
outlined, the landmark ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994 granted 
parliamentary scrutiny authority to the German Bundestag, in relation to the decision-
making process on CSDP-related matters. Although the academic literature argues 
that formal veto power grants parliaments a key instrument in the scrutiny process, 
as it grants the parliamentarians a certain degree of competence (Peters, Wagner & 
Glahn, 2014), those formal competences are more complex than parliament being 
seen as a rubberstamp.  
 
There are several influences that matter in the decision-making process, as this 
chapter will outline. Party discipline, for instance, is one aspect besides the 
parliamentary prerogative. Parliamentarians of the leading coalition were more 
willing to support the mandate, with a clear majority vote in the decision whether to 
participate in the NAVFOR Atalanta mission. The opportunities given to 
parliamentarians to engage in security affairs, and the willingness to do so, are 
interrelated; parliamentarians are ‘more willing to become involved in EU affairs if 
they have the institutional means to do so at their disposal’ (Auel, Rozenberg & 
Tacea, 2015, pp.300-301).  
 
This chapter will focus on the legislative-executive decision-making process in both 
chosen missions, NAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia. First, the chapter will 
explain why the two chosen missions best fit the scope of this thesis and will provide 
a small summary of background information for both operations. The chapter 
concludes with the analysis that the German Bundestag has several options for 
scrutinising the German executive’s decisions on participation in missions abroad, in 




4.2. Military and Civilian missions under the CSDP Umbrella  
Before exploring the missions chosen in this research and the role of the German 
executive and legislative in the decision-making process, it is important to highlight 
the important historical steps in the creation of the CSDP to then understand the 
structure of the CSDP in the decision-making structure to launch missions.  
 
In December 1991, the CFSP was established, with the objectives to safeguard the 
common values, interests, independence, and integrity of the Union per the 
principles of the UN Charter; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to 
preserve peace and strengthen international security, and to promote international 
cooperation as well as develop democracy and respect for human rights22. The 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) states that the EU’s CFSP  
shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including to a common 
defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the 
Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements.  
 
At that time, according to Fritsch (2006), the EU lacked, however, a military 
capability to act autonomously, and the Petersberg Tasks23 manifested the 
recognition of a new security environment in the EU after the Cold War, becoming 
the heart of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), later to be named 
the CSDP. The CSDP forms a part of the CFSP and composes one of the main 
pillars of EU external action, initiated by the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The 
CSDP allows for the development of civilian and military missions that includes 
peacekeeping, conflict prevention and enhancing international security.  
 
The CSDP framework is built on the premises that the EU High Representative for 
Foreign and Security Policy (currently Federica Mogherini)24, proposes the launch of 
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 European Union, Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, 7 
February 1992.  
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 The Petersberg Tasks, agreed upon in 1992, form part of the CSDP and define the spectrum of 
military action within the scope of the European Union operations. Source: European Union External 
Action (2018) Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy (online) Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5388/shaping-common-security-and-
defence-policy_en (Accessed 03.03.2018) 
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 in collaboration with the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee 
(EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) that consists of personnel from the EU member states in 
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a mission and Member States can provide a first indication if they are interested to 
contribute with forces. Once the decision to launch a mission has been agreed upon, 
Member States can join the CSDP mission. Political and military solidarity among the 
EU member states was reinforced through the inclusion of the “solidarity clause” in 
Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): 
The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is 
the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall 
mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by 
the Member States…  
 
As declared in Article 42 (1) of the Treaty of Lisbon, the CSDP framework “shall be 
an integral part of the common foreign and security policy” and is to provide “an 
operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets” for the EU to use for 
crisis-management missions. Most notably, considering the scope of this research 
on the role of the executive-legislative relations in the decision-making process on 
security affairs, Article 42 (2) that declares that the EU member states should adopt 
the decision on CSDP matters in line with their constitutional regulations:  
The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common 
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, 
acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the 
adoption of such as decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.  
 
The most notable fact about the CSDP framework and the decision-making process 
to launch a mission is that the CSDP requires the unanimous support of all EU 
member states on decisions on military issues. This decision to participate in 
missions under the CSDP umbrella, however, is made by the national executives, 
giving them a full right to decide, leaving the national parliaments with a rather 
marginal role to play. However, Moelling and von Voss (2015) argue that the area of 
security has a “serious parliamentary dimension”, in terms of both the decision on 
the use of armed forces and decisions on defence procurements that can affect 
defence cooperation. Moelling and von Voss (2015) further argue that even though 
national parliaments have little influence on the framework conditions and the 
conditions under which troops are being sent abroad, national parliaments still have 
																																																																																																																																																																								
which the latter two are involved in the military planning of an operation and the proper execution of 
the military mission 
	 71	
basic scrutiny mechanisms at hand to engage in monitoring national troops in 
various operations.  
 
The missions that are launched under the CSDP umbrella allow the EU to play a 
principal role in peace-keeping, conflict prevention, and overall strengthening of 
international security (European External Action Service, 2018a). In the Somalian 
area, the EU has especially focused on 3 different sectors: state building and 
securing peace, food security, and education (European Union External Action 
2018b). The 2 missions that were chosen for the analysis – NAVFOR Atalanta and 
EUCAP Somalia – fit very well with the overall goal of the CSDP framework and 
within the scope of this research. Even though both missions fulfil different purposes 
and are different in nature – NAVFOR Atalanta is a military mission and EUCAP 
Somalia is a civilian mission – both aim to secure, stabilise, and support the 
development of security at the seaways at the Horn of Africa and Western Indian 
Ocean by fighting Somali-based piracy and armed robberies (EUNAVFOR, 2018).  
 
Mission selection- NAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia 
There are several reasons why the German Bundestag was chosen. As already 
mentioned, it plays a vital part in the decision-making process about the deployment 
of German troops abroad, a privilege that is not granted to every national parliament 
within the EU. For this study, two CSDP missions have been selected to examine the 
role of the German Bundestag within the decision-making process, one military 
mission and one civilian mission. The reason for choosing two different types of 
mission lies in the nature of the regulations. For military missions, the German 
Bundestag has the legal right to participate and authorise the deployment of military 
troops abroad, granted by the Parliamentary Participation Act. For civilian missions, 
however, there is no official right for the Bundestag to be heard before participation, 
which makes it particularly interesting in the context of this study. 
Germany has participated in several military and civilian missions under the CSDP 
umbrella. Because the scope of the present study is limited, it will answer the 
research question based on two chosen operations. The rationale behind choosing 
these missions – and the reasons why they suit the scope of this study – lies in their 
nature. NAVFOR Atalanta is a military mission, and as the Bundestag has a 
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parliamentary prerogative to approve troop deployment, parliamentary scrutiny may 
be based on formal aspects. EUCAP Somalia is a civilian mission, so the Bundestag 
has no formal say in the matter, and it is likely to have resulted in informal scrutiny. 
These missions are analysed to understand the formal and informal parliamentary 
scrutiny mechanisms. 
 
The literature argues that the prior authorisation of military troop deployments grants 
parliaments a powerful oversight tool. The right to approve or reject the 
government’s proposal for the deployment of military troops is the strongest asset of 
parliamentary oversight (Born & Haenggi, 2005). Born and Haenggi (2005) 
established four models regarding parliamentary involvement in the deployment of 
military troops. They examined the German Bundestag as a ‘strong’ parliament, 
belonging to the group that has the right to decide on, or give prior authorisation of, 
the deployment of military troops. In a typology of parliamentary war powers, 
Dieterich, Hummel, and Marschall (2015) ranked the German Bundestag to be 
‘comprehensive’ and highly influential in security policy, due to its parliamentary 
prerogative. As the legal war power right has been discussed throughout the thesis, 
the focus for discussion of this chapter is more related to the other two factors of 
Born and Haenggi’s triad framework; ability and attitude.  
 
It is interesting to investigate a civilian mission to look beyond the parliamentary 
prerogative. Wagner et al. (2010) argue that MPs should exercise their given 
authority tools, but also use their resources. The latter refers to obtaining information 
on security and CSDP-related matters, which will ensure the opportunity for MPs to 
engage in security policy decision-making processes. As formal powers form a key 
feature of the scrutiny process, the parliamentarians’ abilities and attitudes may 
essentially adjust it (Maatsch & Galella, 2016). While the existing literature often 
focuses on the formal mechanism in effective parliamentary scrutiny, the concepts of 
ability and attitude have been subject to limited research (Huff, 2015). Parliaments, 
therefore, ought to have certain resources that allow them to increase effective 
scrutiny, as well as to become engaged in exercising their authority and resources 
(Wagner, Peters & Glahn, 2010). 
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Both missions were primarily chosen as they are being conducted in a region that 
has attracted the attention of, and fostered cooperation among, EU member states 
and other international institutions. Therefore, a key factor is multilateral cooperation 
and German responsibility to participate. The region is particularly important for 
Germany, as it affects sea routes and the German economy is primarily export-
based. In sum, the two operations chosen for this research are interesting for a 
variety of reasons. They share several similarities: a) both missions were launched 
under the CSDP umbrella; b) they are both ongoing; c) and they are being 
conducted in the same geographical location (see Figure 4.1.) – the coast of 
Somalia– with the main aim of fighting against piracy. However, the decisive factor 
for choosing these missions is that they differ in their nature; NAVFOR Atalanta is 
a military mission, while EUCAP Somalia is a civilian mission. 
 
Table 4.1. The selected CSDP missions for this study 
 Operation Status German Participation Mission Type 
1 NAVFOR Atalanta Ongoing, since 2008 December 2008 Military  
2 EUCAP Somalia Ongoing, since 2012 August 2012 Civilian  
 
 




Most research on the role of national parliaments has drawn on quantitative studies 
of EU affairs (for a detailed overview, see Auel, Rozenberg & Tacea, 2015), or 
parliamentary prerogatives and parliaments’ involvement in the CSDP (Maurer & 
Wessels, 2001), both applying a cross-country comparison. Although previous 
research has looked at the NAVFOR Atalanta operation and parliamentary 
involvement (Peters, Wagner & Glahn, 2014), the focus of this research is solely on 
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the role of the parliamentary prerogative in a cross country comparison, and did not 
look at informal channels for parliamentary participation. Little attention has been 
paid to parliamentary scrutiny over civilian missions. One possible explanation for 
this could be that approval by the Bundestag is not required for the country to 
participate in civilian missions abroad. Therefore, other factors may provide clues 
about opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny over security policy and explore other 
mechanisms available to Bundestag members to enhance the scrutiny mechanisms 
related to both military and civilian missions. 
 
4.2.1. Background of the Operations NAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia 
In 2008, the CSDP-grounded ‘Operation Atalanta’ was launched to safeguard the 
sea routes in the Pacific region that have been afflicted by pirates and organised 
crime, leading to a humanitarian crisis. Its role is to “contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast” 
(Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP). The decision to launch the mission was based 
on a serios of previous United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions: 
 
¥ Resolution 1814 (2008) The Security Council reiterates its support… to protect the World 
Food Programme maritime convoys, calls upon States and regional organizations…to take 




¥ Resolution 1816 (2008) The Security Council was gravely concerned by the threat that acts 
of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to the promt, safe and effective delivery of 




¥ Resolution 1838 (2008) The Security Council recalled on the previous Resolutions 1814 
and 1816 and commended on the establishment by the European Union of a coordination 
unit with the taks of supporting the surveillance and protection activities carried out by some 
member States of the European Union off the coast of Somalia, and the ongoing planning 
process towards a possible European Union naval operation…
27
 
¥ Resolution 1844 (2008) The Security Council emphasised the continued contribution made 
to Somalia’s peace and security…and recalls its intention…to take measure against those 




¥ Resolution 1846 (2008) The Security Council expressed again its determination to ensure 
the long- term security of World Food Programme (WFP) maritime deliveries to 
Somalia…and recalled the establishment by the European Union (EU) of a coordination unit 
with the task of supporting the surveillance and protecting activities carried out by some 





 S/RES/1814 (2008) available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1814(2008) 
26
 S/RES/1816 (2008) available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1816(2008) 
27
 S/RES/1838 (2008) available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1838(2008) 
28
 S/RES/1844 (2008) available at: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1844(2008)	
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Later, in 2012, the civilian mission, EUCAP Somalia, was launched to support the 
area around the Somalian Coast. German armed forces participated at the launch of 
both missions.  
 
The launch of the EU-led naval mission at the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian 
Ocean was prompted by the increasing activity of Somali-based piracy and armed 
robbery (EEAS, 2018). Somalia has been one of the largest humanitarian crisis 
areas in the world and as of September 2017, more than three million people here 
relied on urgent humanitarian aid (World Food Programme, 2018). While the aid was 
primarily provided by the United Nations World Food Program (WFP), attacks by 
pirates on ships that carried urgent humanitarian aid hindered the operations to 
provide the supplies to the suffering Somali population. In addition to these 
humanitarian considerations, another reason for sending a European naval mission 
was that the pirates operating in this area were an increasing threat to security and 
international shipping (EEAS, 2018). This was especially the case with the area 
around the Gulf of Aden that provides an important sea route between Europe and 
Asia. Heading to and from the Suez Canal, the area sees the passing of up to 
30,000 ships each year (Reuters, 2011). In fact, millions of tonnes of crude oil, 
petroleum, gas and coal is among the freight that is ferried every month through this 
area. However, the leading operatives of the global merchant fleet that carries 90 
percent of the world´s freight have been forced to consider bypassing the Gulf of 
Aden and the Suez Canal (Reuters, 2011). 
 
Piracy and the attendant concern for Somalia's development -- in terms of both 
humanitarian and security aspects -- began to deepen after the overthrow of the 
Somali President, Siad Barre, in 1991 (Novaky, 2018). The overthrow of the 
dictatorial Barre led to the collapse of the Somali central government and left 
Somalia and its coastlines largely ungoverned, which allowed self-appointed militias 
to roam freely in the country´s territory and in its waters (Novaky, 2018). In fact, 
following the downfall of President Siad Barre, civil war broke out between the 
supporters of President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and the supporters of General 
Mohamed Farah. Collaborating with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the UN 
subsequently tried to solve the conflict, providing humanitarian aid and leading the 
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arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in 1992 against Somalia as well as 
establishing the ‘United Nations Operation in Somalia’ (UNOSOM) (United Nations, 
2018). 
The Security Council… decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that 
all states shall, for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, immediately 
implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military 
equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise (UN Resolution 733, 1992) 
 
In UN Resolution 81430, the UN Security Council expressed its concerns for the 
continuing violations of international humanitarian law and authorized to expand 
UNOSOM. In 2004, a transitional government was appointed, yet has been 
incapable to uphold order within Somalia (Geiss and Petrig, 2011). Meanwhile, in 
January 2007, the peace mission known as the 'African Union Mission in Somalia' 
(AMISOM) was launched. This mission was created by the African Union´s Peace 
and Security Council with the aims of supporting the stabilization of the country and 
providing peacekeeping forces (African Union Mission in Somalia, 2018).  
 
Piracy is not a new phenomenon to Somali waters, as stated in ‘the Report of the 
Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811’31, Piracy 
in Somalia’s waters has developed from a ‘domestic nuisance’ into a ‘sophisticated 
and well- organised industry’. An estimated 30,000 vessels passing through the sea 
lanes of the Gulf of Aden every year32. In February 2008, the Somalian government 
asked the UN Security Council for help in the fight against piracy (Bundeswehr, 
2018) and the Security Council subsequently took up the issue by proposing several 
resolutions:  
 
On May 15, 2008, the UNSC called for action in terms of the general protection of 
humanitarian aid:  
…underlining the importance of providing and maintaining stability and security 
throughout Somalia, and underscoring the importance of disarmament, demobilisation 




 S/RES/814 (1993) available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/814 
31
 Available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/769 
32
 United Nations “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
1811 (2008), available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2008/769 
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The UN Resolution 1816 of June 2008 then went into more detail and particularly 
focused on the impact of piracy in this region and its threat to the humanitarian aid 
efforts: 
…gravely concerned by the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against 
vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, 
the safety of commercial maritime routes and to international navigation… 
 
The UN Resolution 1838 of October 2008 then highlighted the fact that the threat of 
piracy was increasing: 
…gravely concerned by the recent proliferation of acts of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea against vessels off the coast of Somalia…noting with concern also that 
increasingly violent acts of piracy are carried out with heavier weaponry, in a larger 
area off the coast of Somalia...demonstrating more sophisticated organisation and 
methods of attack… 
 
On 8 December 2008, the EU adopted the naval mission, ‘Atalanta’, which included 
the participation and contribution of several European member states. This mission 
was launched to “contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of 
piracy and robbery off the Somali coast” (Council Decision 2008/ 918/ CFSP). The 
CSDP military missions were derived from several UNSC Resolutions:  
 
Condemning all acts of violence and extremism inside Somalia and expressing its 
concern regarding the continued violence inside Somalia (UNSC 1801, 2008).  
  
Reaffirming the importance of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence and unity of Somalia (UNSC 1811, 2008; 1831, 2008). 
 
…reiterates its support for the contribution made by some States to protect the World 
Food Programme maritime convoys, call upon States and regional organizations…to 
take action to protect shipping involved with the transportation and delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Somalia and United Nations-authorized activities… (UNSC 1814, 
2008).  
 
…condemns and deplores all acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels in 
territorial waters and the high seas off the coast of Somalia (UNSC 1816, 2008.) 
 
Meanwhile, German support for the mission came as no surprise, given the fact that 
Germany is, alongside China and the US, among the world’s leading trading nations. 
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Along with the protection of their own economic interests, Germany was also 
concerned with ensuring a secure naval passage alongside the Somali coast for their 
trading partners (Bergstrand and Engelbrekt, 2016). On December 10, 2008, the 
federal government proposed to participate with the German armed forces by 
providing up to 1400 soldiers in the Atalanta operation (BT-Drs. 16/ 11337). On 
December 19, the Bundestag accepted the government proposal by a large majority 
(Plenary protocol 16/ 197). Since then, there have been several mandate 
extensions33, all with German Bundestag approval, and the current mandate for the 
provision of German armed forces in the Atalanta mission with an upper limit of 600 
soldiers runs until 31 May 2018 (Bundeswehr, 2018). 
 
In line with the Atalanta mission’s aim of aiding the Horn of Africa, the civilian 
mission, ‘EUCAP Somalia’ was established in 2012. On August 15 of that year, the 
German Federal Cabinet agreed to German participation. The aim of the mission 
was to assist the Somali government by sending experts to perform actions such as 
establishing a coastal police force for the country and providing support for legal 
issues related to maritime safety. However, its overall aim was not to fight the pirates 
directly (Foreign Office, 2017a). The civilian mission, EUCAP Somalia was finally 
launched On July 16, 2012 to assist the development in the Horn of Africa and the 
Western Indian Ocean States in terms of their self-sustainable capacity for continued 
enhancement of their maritime security, including counter-piracy and maritime 
governance (Council Decision 2012/ 389/ CFSP). EUCAP Somalia had an initial 
geographic focus on Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles and Somalia, while it was also 
to be deployed in Tanzania, following the receipt of an invitation from the Tanzanian 
authorities (Article 2) by the Union. From 2012 to 2015, German armed forces 
participated in this mission, before military participation was suspended in April 2015. 
However, up to five officials of the federal and state police as well as several civilian 





BT- Drs. 17/ 179 (09.12.2009), BT- Drs. 17/ 3691 (10.11.2010), BT- Drs. 17/ 7742 (16.11.2011), BT-  
Drs. 17/ 9339 (18.04.2012), BT- Drs. 17/ 13111 (17.04.2013), BT- Drs. 18/ 1282 (30.04.2014), BT- 
Drs. 18/ 4769 (29.04.2015), BT- Drs. 18/ 8091 (13.04.2016), BT- Drs. 18/ 11621 (22.03.2017) 
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4.3. The executive’s proposal to deploy German armed forces and 
Parliamentary activities prior operations  
 





On 19 December 2008, the German Bundestag decided that Germany would 
participate in the EU’s anti-piracy mission. Chancellor Angel Merkel emphasised the 
connection between 'classical security and the security of the economy'. For the 
latter, the Chancellor explicitly counted on the security of transport routes. These 
would be endangered by pirates. For this reason, the Federal government assumed 
its responsibility. According to Merkel, the German mission is not least due to its own 
interests. Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Defence Minister Jung gave details on the 
design of the German contribution to Atalanta in a letter that became publicly 
available on 5 December 2008. Both, Steinmeier and Jung, showed particularly in 
the operational orientation of the German contributions. The letter, so Brummer 
(2013), contained defensive elements, such as the prevention and the defence of the 
pirate attacks as well as offensive elements, such as a direct plan for an attack on 
the pirates.  
 
The Atalanta mission was in line with Germany’s national interest and thus in support 
of the German public as the mission would protect vessels shipping humanitarian aid 
and commercial goods. In 2008, when the Atalanta mission was launched, the public 
poll of the Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr shows that every 
second German supports an active foreign and security policy even though many 
Germans ‘have no concrete knowledge of current Bundeswehr missions abroad, or 
have never even hear of them’ (Bulman, 2009 p. 11-12). Despite the lack of 
knowledge, Bundeswehr missions are supported by a large majority of the German 
population because of their confidence in the German armed forces (Bulman, 2009 
p. 12). German politicians highlighted humanitarian reasons as a key reason for 
participating in several plenary debates as well as its’ economic interests which were 
																																																						
34
 Original: was nützt uns ein freier Handel, wenn man mit einem Schiff nicht dahin kommt, wohin man 
will? Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 128-1, 26 November 2008 
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affected by the developments in the Horn of Africa. The fight against piracy in the 
Horn of Africa was an opportunity to provide a service in this regard.  
           
4.3.1. Plenary debates and discussions on whether to participate in NAVFOR 
Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia 
Plenary debates in the German Bundestag provide a platform for information 
exchange and discussions that ultimately lead to the decision-making of daily 
matters during the sittings. The plenary is made up of all the members of the 
Bundestag and divided according to the voting results of the general election (see 
Table 4.4.1.); each sitting is conducted by the President of the Bundestag or the 
deputy (Deutscher Bundestag, 2018a). In the German parliament, it is the plenary 
session that ultimately decides on troop deployment, which contrasts to other 
countries such as Austria or Spain, where the decision to send troops abroad is 
taken in committees (Wagner, 2017). 
 
Plenary debates are public, as demanded by the German Constitution. That means 
that they are broadcast live in the media, and viewers can watch them unfold. On the 
one hand, this guarantees transparency about the events taking place, awakens 
interest among the population concerning the activities of the parliament, and 
increases the self-control of the deputies, but according to Schiller (2002), it is also 
appropriate that the discussions conducted in the plenum are directly influenced by 
the voters’ preferences. On the other hand, the live transmissions change the 
content, style, and atmosphere of the Bundestag and mean that the actual work of 
the parliament, which takes place in committees – and in particular German security 















Foreign policy and international issues make up a considerable proportion of the 
plenary debates of the Bundestag, and define the Federal Government’s foreign and 
security policy course vis-à-vis other states and in international negotiations 
(Ismayer, 2007). Plenary sessions serve to induce the government and 
administration to provide factual information, expose the deficits, intentions, and 
priorities of government policy, and examine government and administrative action 
both in detail and conceptually. Often, the initiative to hold a plenary debate comes 
from the opposition, but the government often makes use of its ability to issue a 
government bill to the Bundestag at any time, which is followed by a regular debate. 
Foreign and European policy dominates, with more than half of all government 
declarations being made by the Federal Chancellor or the Foreign Minister (Ismayer, 
2007). 
 
In the debate about whether to participate in the NAVFOR Atalanta mission, there 
were several plenary debates to discuss the executive’s proposal and wish for the 
Bundestag to approve the foreign deployment of German armed forces. Participation 
in the civilian mission EUCAP Somalia did not require formal approval by the 
German Bundestag, but the overall positive resonance of parliamentarians, as well 
as the government, was evident. Germany, being an advocate for human rights and 
humanitarian aid, as enshrined in Article 1 of the German Basic Law, supports the 
general objective of both missions on the Somalian coast. The focus of the 
																																																						




humanitarian nature of the operations was evident in the numerous speeches given 
by the German executive in plenary sessions, in particular on December 17, 2008, 
seven days after the proposal by the executive to participate in the NAVFOR 
Atalanta mission. 
 
Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung and Foreign Minister Franz- Walter Steinmeier 
emphasised the humanitarian characteristics of the operation and thus requested the 
approval of the Bundestag for German participation. Steinmeier argued in the 
plenary debate on December 17, 200836 that the criminal activities undertaken by the 
pirates attacking ships in the Horn of Africa threatened the stability that the people of 
Somalia depend on. Steinmeier stated that in his opinion, this should not be allowed 
to continue:  
The pirates are attacking ships in the Horn of Africa and this year alone, [have] already 
[attacked] more than 200 ships ... these criminal acts threaten the last remnants of order that 
people in Somalia depend on. I think we should not just allow that to happen. That is what the 




In acknowledgement of the fact that millions of people in the Somalian region are 
dependent on foreign aid, Steinmeier highlighted the fact that Germany had decided 
to participate and support the EU-led NAVFOR Atalanta mission in order to secure 
both the transportation of humanitarian aid to Somalia and civilian shipping. By 
securing civilian shipping, one important aspect in terms of the German national 
interest was mentioned by Steinmeier when he argued that: 
Through the Gulf of Aden goes... the main trade route between Europe and Asia: 20,000 
ships a year with this destination. Many of them belong to German shipping companies, or 




Steinmeier further highlighted the importance of supporting the international 
community with German participation: 
																																																						
36
 BT- plenary protocol 16/195, December 17, 2008. 
37
 Own translation; original: Die Piraten ueberfallen Schiffe am Horn von Afrika, allein in diesem Jahr 
sind das bereits ueber 200 Schiffe… mit diesen kriminellen Umtrieben werden die letzten Reste von 
ordnung bedroht, auf die die Menschen in Somalia angewiesen sind. Ich finde, wir duerfen das nicht 
einfach geschehen lassen. Das sagt die Weltgemeinschaft, und das muessen auch wir mit 
Ueberzeugung sagen. 
38
 Own translation; original: Durch den Golf von Aden verlaeuft naemlich…der Hauptstrang der 
Handelsstroehme zwischen Europa und Asien: 20.000 Schiffe jaehrlich mit dieser Destination. Viele 
davon gehoeren deutschen Reedereien oder transportieren Fracht aus oder fuer Deutschland. 
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We support every effort that leads to a political understanding in Somalia ... I think our job is 
huge. It’s about the end of the civil war, the eradication and building of state institutions in the 
police and judiciary ... It will be a long journey ... but we also know that we cannot just leave 





In the final part of his speech, in his role as a member of the Federal Government, 
Foreign Minister Steinmeier asked the Bundestag to agree to the deployment of 
German armed forces in Operation Atalanta (BT- plenary protocol 16/195, December 
17, 2008). His main arguments included the fact that in this way, Germany and the 
EU would send out an important message in three ways: for the people in Somalia, 
for the security in the region, and for international solidarity. Defence Minister Jung 
was of the same opinion as Steinmeier in the plenary session, arguing that it is an 
urgent matter and in German interests to effectively counter the scourge of piracy 
and ensure military security and free maritime trade, as well as for humanitarian 
reasons. Thus, the perspective of the German executive towards participation in the 
NAVFOR Atalanta mission sent a clear message to the German Bundestag to give 
its approval for participation (BT- plenary protocol 16/195, December 17, 2008). 
 
Members of the German Bundestag questioned the executive about its proposal to 
participate in the mission. One point was raised by Rainer Stinner (FDP) in the 
session (BT- plenary protocol 16/195, December 17, 2008). Though Stinner 
acknowledged the many correct and important points in the executive’s mandate and 
that the executive’s proposal was promising, he raised the question as to how 
German armed forces would be able to fight piracy on the Somalian coast. Stinner 
stated that he expected the Federal Government to use military means so that it 
could complete all necessary tasks, including the responsibilities described in points 




	 Own	 translation;	 original:	 Wir unterstuetzen jede Anstrengung, die zu einer politischen 
Verstaendigung in Somalia fuehrt… Ich glaube unsere Aufgabe ist riesig. Es geht um das Ende des 
Buergerkrieges, um Aussoehnung und um den Aufbau von staatlichen Institutionen in Polizei und 
Justiz…Das wird ein langer Weg… aber wir wissen auch, dass wir Regionen wie Somalia nicht 
einfach ihrem Schicksal ueberlassen duerfen…Das beruehrt in einer Welt, die immer enger 
zusammenrueckt, nun einmal uns alle. BT- plenary protocol 16/195, December 17, 2008	
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3 a) Provide protection for World Food Program (WFP) vessels, among other aims, through 
the presence of armed forces on board these ships, especially if they pass through the 
territorial waters of Somalia. 
3 e) Monitoring areas off the coast of Somalia, including the Somalian territorial waters that 
present dangers to maritime activities, in particular maritime transport. 
 
Stinner’s first point of critique included the fact that German armed forces would be 
focused on the safeguarding of single ships. Stinner argued that German interests 
were not primarily related to the safeguarding of individual ships, even though this 
was important and correct. Rather, their focus should be on securing the freedom of 
the seas and sea routes, which can only be achieved through an active fight against 
piracy. Stinner concluded his statement in the plenary session by claiming that it 
would lead to an ‘endless mission’ if ships were only to be accompanied, and that it 
was more important to destroy the pirates’ ships (BT- Drs. 16/11337). 
 
In civilian missions, the German Bundestag’s approval is not required. Yet, according 
to a EU-wide survey on parliamentary oversight of CSDP operations, German 
legislative staff ‘noted the willingness of their parliament to exercise oversight of both 
civilian and military ESDP missions’ (Born et al., 2007, p. 25). Germany has interests 
in civilian missions and has highlighted the significance of a civilian operational 
component and been the main supporter of a ‘civilian CSDP’ (Simon, 2017). As 
Germany is often described as having a ‘culture of restraint’, following increasing 
pressure from German allies, the deployment of forces for humanitarian reasons 
have evolved to focus on civilian tools above military (Chappell, 2012). Germany’s 
contribution is marked by the money spent and personnel deployed to strengthen the 
civilian aspect of the CSDP (Simon, 2017).  
 
Plenary sessions provide a platform for the Bundestag to scrutinise the decision-
making process concerning the deployment of military forces abroad. While the 
parliamentary prerogative and plenary session form vital parts of the scrutiny of 
government proposals, the Bundestag has never rejected any executive’s proposal 
because it is questionable whether in such a case, the parliament-leading coalition 
would turn against the government (Wagner, 2017). Wagner (2017) further argues 
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that this is not only a German phenomenon but that outside Germany, legislative 
votes against participation in military missions are particularly uncommon. 
 
4.3.2. Parliamentary voting on participation in the Atalanta mission and the 
relevance of Party discipline 
The principal mechanism to influence the executive is, according to Peters, Wagner 
and Glahn (2014, p.435), the German Bundestag’s constitutional right (parliamentary 
prerogative) to decide on German armed forces deployment abroad. In the case of 
the Atalanta operation, MPs of the leading party voted in favour of the government’s 
proposal to deploy German armed forces abroad. On 19 December 2008, the 
German Bundestag voted with a clear majority in favour of participation and 
deploying German armed forces in the Atalanta mission.	By examining the voting 
results, it is noticeable that the leading parliamentary parties voted in favour of their 
government40. Table 4.2. shows the Bundestag’s voting results for the different 
mandates on NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, emphasising that the parties of the 
leading coalition voted in favour of German troop deployment almost without any ‘no’ 
votes.		
	
The fact that the Bundestag voted in balance with the German executive strengthens 
the claim that the leading political party in the Bundestag belongs to the executive’s 
political party, and thus the leading coalition would support the government’s 
decision regardless. Parliamentarians of the leading coalition are also more likely to 
have had additional access to information channels, such as using the opportunity 
for parliamentary questions, before providing their approval of the Atalanta operation. 
They are also able to visit the German armed forces that are stationed abroad in 
Djibouti (Peters, Wagner & Glahn, 2014). 	
 
Table 4.2. Bundestag vote on Participation in the EU- led Atalanta Mission
41
 
Political Party ‘Yes’ votes ‘No’ votes Abstentions 
CDU/ CSU 209 0 1 
SPD 194 2 3 
																																																						
40






FDP 53 0 0 
Die Linke (Left) 0 46 0 
B. 90/The Greens 35 6 8 
 
Party discipline is a crucial factor to scrutinise the executive (Born & Haenggi, 2005). 
Huff (2015) agrees and argues that in cases of party dissension, parliamentarians 
are of greater importance to hold the government accountable for their actions (Huff, 
2015). In a study by Peters, Wagner and Glahn (2014) over parliamentary scrutiny 
on the Atalanta mission, German MPs argued that they can exercise influence over 
the executive, even before the mandate is formally written. This is done through 
communication between the executive and the parliamentary majority, to elaborate 
whether the parliamentary majority would support a mandate to deploy armed forces 
abroad, resulting in parliamentary influence of the content of the mandate. In their 
study, parliamentarians argued that the ‘flow of information’ is reduced with the 
parliamentary opposition, in that the executive informs their own majority earlier, 
compared to the opposition. Even though there is no formal, legal requirement to 
parliamentary approval before participation and hence no information required, 
parliamentarians were informed also about the EUCAP Somalia mission as both 
missions, EUCAP Somalia and NAVFOR, are operating in the same region, thus 
they are interlinked.  
 
Party discipline plays a role in the distribution of information. Crum and Fossum 
(2013) argue that the flow of information is more intense with the parliamentary 
majority and less with the opposition. The intensity of the flow of information aims 
also for the executive to get an idea of the overall support of participation in military 
operations including sending German armed forces abroad. This gives the executive 
an insight of how the mandate to deploy troops abroad should be organised and 
written (Crum and Fossum, 2013). The fact that the parliamentarians are involved in 
the mandate writing process by assessing their positions and their point of views in 
participating in troop deployment, gives the German MPs a certain influence (Crum 
and Fossum, 2013).  
 
As parliaments represent the public, public opinion is especially important for the 
parliamentarians as they are the representatives of the electorate. Thus, the opinion 
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of the German public plays a key role in the parliamentary scrutiny on CSDP related 
decisions. A 2017 report by the European Commission (Figure 4.3.) on the topic of 
whether one is in favour or against of a common defence and security policy among 
EU Member States, indicates a clear preference of the German public (84%) to 
support the CSDP.  
 
Figure 4.3.: Opinion on a common defence and security policy among EU Member States (%), 
2017 
 
Source: European Commission (2017). Special Eurobarometer 461 Report. Designing Europe’s 





















Figure 4.4.: Opinion on a common defence and security policy among EU Member States (%), 
2010 
 
Source: European Commission (2010). Eurobarometer 70, Public opinion in the European Union. 
Available: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_full_en.pdf 
 
The fact that the German public is in favour of a common defence and security policy 
is not a new phenomenon, already in 2008 when the NAVFOR Atalanta mission was 
deployed, the German public opinion proportion of support was at a high of 82% 
(with the overall EU proportion of 75% in favour of a common defence and security 
policy (Figure 4.4.), according to Fieldwork undertaken in October- November 2008 
and published in 2010 by the European Commission Eurobarometer 70. 
 
4.3.3. The German Bundestag’s activities prior to both selected missions  
The focus of this research is to observe the extent to which the German Bundestag 
can scrutinise the decision-making process for sending troops abroad. As such, is it 
vital to explore the tools that are available to parliament for doing so.  
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The large scope of information is essential to the scrutiny process, which can be 
claimed by the members of both the leading coalition, as well as opposition parties 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2018b). The German Bundestag can raise kleine anfragen 
(small inquiries) and grosse anfragen (large inquiries) as means for questioning the 
government on selected issues, both forms of inquiries are frequently used to 
scrutinise the government’s decisions (Deutscher Bundestag, 2018b). Small inquiries 
are answered by the government in writing only, whereas large inquiries are debated 
in the Bundestag. As major issues are primarily political issues, opposition parties 
have the opportunity to question the government in public plenaries, and express 
their views (Deutscher Bundestag, 2018b).  
 
More tools available to the Bundestag in the scrutiny process include written 
questions and question times, aktuelle stunde (current hour), and surveying the 
government. Each member of the Bundestag can present up to four questions a 
month to be answered by the government, in writing, within a week of receipt. The 
questions raised, as well as their answers, are published in the weekly plenary 
document. In addition, each member of parliament has the right to present up to two 
questions per week to the government during so-called ‘question time’. Members of 
parliament also have the opportunity to request a aktuelle stunde (current hour) if 
they are dissatisfied with the information provided by the government during question 
time. Finally, immediately after the federal government’s internal meeting, 
parliamentarians have another opportunity to present questions about current issues 
to the members of the German executive (Deutscher Bundestag, 2018b). 
 
Parliamentary activities prior to Operation Atalanta 
It is particularly important to observe parliamentary activities prior to the German 
Bundestag approving participation in the Atalanta mission, to observe whether 
indications are present for acknowledging parliament as a ‘rubber stamp’ or an active 
scrutiniser. In total, three small queries were submitted to be answered by the 






Table 4.3. Parliamentary activities prior to German participation in NAVFOR Atalanta. 




Small inquiry on the use of armed forces against pirates and measures to 
prevent piracy off the coast of Somalia 




Small request on the participation of German soldiers in the planned EU 
mission 'Atalanta' 
Initiative: FDP  





Small request on piracy offensive in the Horn of Africa 
Initiative: Group Alliance 90/Greens 
Response from the federal government BT-Drs. 16/11382, 17 December 
2008 
 
In the three small questions raised by the opposition parties Die Linke (the left), the 
FDP, and The Greens used the opportunity to ask the government for German 
participation in the Atalanta mission. Die Linke (BT-Drucksache 16/11021) criticised 
the EU decision on the military operation, which raised questions about the political 
meaning of constitutional and international law, for example, about dealing with 
captured persons and the legal basis for the participation of German armed forces. 
In addition, the party criticised the states who wanted to participate in the military 
fight against piracy, but who have to date shown little initiative in addressing the 
structural causes of avoidance and the long-term processing of piracy. Thus, Die 
Linke raised several question with the German executive, in particular regarding the 
scope and background of the mission. This included the development of ship traffic 
in the international waters off the Somali coast during the past five years, and in 
particular, the deployment of, e.g., the German Bundeswehr, and according to what 
criteria the federal government will evaluate whether the Bundeswehr's involvement 
in the EU military operation Atalanta could actually contribute to minimising the 
piracy risk. 
 
The small request of the FDP, made on 25 November 2008 (BT- Drs. 16/11088) to 
the federal government, explained that according to the federal government, the right 
to take action against active pirates is a general rule of international law under Article 
25 of the German Basic Law. Additionally, the FDP was also more broadly interested 
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in the future of the Atalanta operation, and asked the German executive whether, 
according to the federal government, further activities planned by NATO would in the 
future mandate the area in which Atalanta would be executed, and if so, how this 
was in accordance with the European Union? 
 
The Greens were also interested in more details about the Atalanta mission. They 
posed questions to the federal government on 28 November 2008 about the reason 
NATO is leading a stand-alone mission to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa, which 
is being conducted exclusively by European armed forces, and in particular wanted 
to know if this would make coordination on the ground more difficult. In addition, the 
FDP had an interest in exactly how the individual mission operations – Atalanta (EU), 
the allied operation (NATO), and the US-led anti-terror Operation Enduring Freedom 
– differed (BT- Drs. 16/11150). 
 
Between the request of the federal government on 10 December 2008 for German 
troops to participate in the Atlanta mission, the recommendation of the foreign 
committee on 17 December (BT-Drs. 16/11416), and the approval of the German 
Bundestag on 19 December 2008, the Bundestag continued asking questions of the 
government. For example, on 17 December 2008 (BT- Drs. 16/11424), The Greens 
demanded that the government guarantee that the deployment of German forces 
takes place on a clear and legal basis at all times, and that prosecution in practice 
takes place in accordance with mandates and fundamental rights, and that the 
Bundestag will be adequately addressed in the event of significant changes such as 
new UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, the Bundestag called upon the 
German Government to receive information earlier and more comprehensively, and 
to present the principles, goals, and means of deployment more extensively than had 
previously been the case.  
 
Die Linke party asked the German executive on 17 December 2008 (BT- Drs. 
16/11423) not to provide German forces for the fight against piracy, not as part of the 
framework for the EU military mission Atalanta, NATO, or in the framework of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, and instead to leave the control of piracy to German 
police forces. In addition, Die Linke requested the German executive call for a 
general end to military intervention in Somalia, and to support negotiations between 
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all political actors of the country that focus on creating a Somali Government. 
Contrarily, on 17 December 2008 (BT- Drs. 16/11422), the FDP supported the 
mandate and requested that Germany actively participate in the EU-led mission, 
Atalanta, within its full scope.  
  
In summary, prior to approving German armed forces being deployment as part of 
the Atalanta mission, the German Bundestag made use of mechanisms in place to 
scrutiny such decisions. This was done by having political parties raise three small 
inquiries, to be answered by the German executive. Notably, these questions were 
raised by the opposition parties in parliament.  
 
Parliamentary activities prior to EUCAP Somalia 
Operation EUCAP Somalia is not a military mission and thus not a use of armed 
forces within the meaning of the Parliamentary Participation Act. Thus, the 
participation of German armed forces in EUCAP Somalia did not require the 
approval of the German Bundestag (Federal Government, 2012). Though, German 
parliamentarians have shown an interest in the government’s actions which was 
noticeable during the Bundestag’s questioning of the executive regarding their 
commitment to combating piracy at the Horn of Africa (BT- Drs. 18/1326, 06 May 
2014). The questions raised by the parliamentarians concerned the challenges to 
Operation EUCAP Somalia, such as whether the mission can be successful and if 
any adjustments needed to be made42. Furthermore, the parliamentarians of the 
Bundestag were also interested in the geographical area, and whether Somalia and 
neighbouring countries were cooperating in the mission to secure the Somalian 
coast and the trade routes. The executive responded that Somalia and Djibouti were 
partner states in the civilian mission43.  
 
MPs have also shown their interest in the German engagement to fight piracy at the 
Horn of Africa through a kleine Anfrage (small inquiry). One question regarded 
whether the various European missions, such as EUCAP Somalia, would be 
																																																						
42
 Original: Mit welchen Herausforderungen ist die Zivil- militaerische Ausbildungsmission EUCAP 
Somalia konfrontiert, und inwiefern haben sich das Missionsdesign und der Gesamtansatz der 
Mission bewaehrt? Wo git es nach Ansicht der Bundesregierung Aenderungsbedarf? BT- Drs. 
18/1326, 06.05.2014 
43
 Original: Kooperieren Somalia and weitere Staaten, wie Djibouti, Eritrea, Jemen oder Kenia, mit der 
EU zur Bekaempfung von Piraterie? BT- Drs. 18/1326, 06.05.2014 
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modified, adapted or terminated as part of the EU’s maritime security strategy44. The 
German parliamentarians were also interested in the measures and initiatives in 
civilian cooperation that have so far been taken by the EU and the Federal 
Government, and what they are specifically planning to counter piracy at the Horn of 
Africa45. Lastly, questions were raised regarding the extent to which the Federal 
Government plan to present comprehensive mandates in the future also includes 
civilian measures.46  
 
In contrast to the large inquiries, the small inquiries are not discussed in a plenary 
session. Though, the small inquiries are a popular method to be used by the 
opposition to ask questions about the government’s activities because the questions 
and answers are publicly accessible (Siefken, 2010). Questions to the government 
about their activities by the opposition fulfils two main purposes- to receive 
information and to the control the government (Schiebe, 2016). One significant 
potential of the small inquires lies in the unpredictability as they can be raised ad-hoc 
by the opposition which puts the government in the situation to be faced with 
questions at any time (Schiebe, 2016). The government is obliged to answer 
questions of the opposition which gives the opposition an important role in controlling 
the government’s activities by receiving information on the one hand. One the other 
hand, the opposition cannot be sure about the truthfulness and the completeness of 
the government’s answers (Schiebe, 2016).  
 
4.4. Conclusion- Parliamentary influence over the decision- making process to 
participate in NAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia? 
This chapter has analysed the military Operation NAVFOR Atalanta and the civilian 
mission EUCAP Somalia. The aim was to establish whether the German Bundestag 
can scrutinise the government’s decision on CSDP related matters, including 
deploying German armed forces abroad prior, during, and post-operations.  
																																																						
44
 Original: Sollen die verschiedenenen europaeischen Missionen with EUCAP Somalia, EUTM 
Somalia and EU NAVFOR Somalia im Rahmen der in Entwicklung befindlichen maritimen 
Sicherheitsstrategie der EU veraendert, angepasst oder beendet werden? BT- Drs. 18/ 1326, 
06.05.2014 
45
 Original: Welche Massnahmen und Initiativen im Bereich der zivilen Zusammenarbeit haben die EU 
und die Bundesregierung bisher ergriffen, und welche planen sie konkret, um der Piraterie am Horn 
von Afrika zu begegen? BT- Drs. 18/1326, 06.05.2014 
46
 Original: Inwiefern plant die Bundesregierung vor diesem Hintergrund, in Zukunft umfassende 
Mandate vorzulegen, die auch die zivilen Massnahmen enthalten? BT- Drs. 18/1326, 06.05.2014	
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From the perspective of authority, the German Bundestag has an advantage over 
other national parliaments, as it has the legal authority to scrutinise decisions, as 
parliament must give approval before participation in any military mission. Such 
parliamentary scrutinising power has been applied to the Atalanta mission, as this is 
classified as a military mission. Contrarily, as EUCAP Somalia is a civilian mission, 
the parliament was not able to exercise its scrutinising power.  
 
Given that the parliament has the legal authority to decide on troop deployment, it 
requires the correct flow of information to exercise its role to the full extent. The 
German Bundestag has been granted formal rights to be informed by the executive 
in a timely matter. In the Atalanta operation, parliament had the opportunity to 
receive information through parliamentary plenary debates, which the 
parliamentarians used for information exchange. Because Operation Somalia is a 
civilian mission, and does not need parliamentary approval, there was less 
information exchange. However, as the EUCAP Somalia mission is linked to the 
NAVFOR Atalanta mission, information channels were provided to the 
parliamentarians and the opportunity was given to raise questions, used by the 

















Chapter 5: Conclusion – a role for the German Bundestag in 
the decision-making process? 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This thesis sought to examine the scrutiny abilities of the German Bundestag in the 
decision-making process concerning sending troops abroad. By doing so, it was 
possible to gain insight about the degree to which the German Bundestag can 
influence German security policy, and how this may affect German participation in 
multilateral CSDP-led operations. This study offers insight into the role of the 
German Bundestag in the decision-making process with regards to security policy. 
The German Bundestag was the chosen case for this study, as it presents an 
interesting example. On the one hand, Germany is the largest EU member state and 
the economic powerhouse of Europe; on the other, the German executive’s mandate 
requires the Bundestag’s approval prior to any military troop deployment, granted by 
the Federal Constitutional Court.  
 
This study focused on the scrutiny mechanisms that the German Bundestag can 
activate in legislative-executive relations in the decision-making process when 
participating in CSDP operations by answering the primary research question: To 
what extent can the German Bundestag scrutinise decisions on common security 
and defence policy operations? This thesis argues that the German Bundestag has 
an influential role to play in the legislative-executive relations in the decision-making 
process, as it pertains to CSDP-related affairs. This chapter’s objectives are to link 
the established factors and mechanisms in a bid to investigate the role of the 
German Bundestag in security affairs, in particular, the impact of the German 
Bundestag on decisions related to troop deployment abroad. By doing so, the 
chapter will illustrate its contribution to the existing literature on EU studies, German 
foreign policy and EU security studies.  
 
This conclusion chapter includes four parts. The first part emphasises the findings of 
this research and discusses the impact of the German Bundestag in the decision-
making process by answering the two sub-research questions. The second part 
situates the findings of this research in the de- and reparliamentarisation thesis and 
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concludes whether the German Bundestag can be regarded as a rubber stamp or 
active scrutiniser in the decision- making process. The last part of this chapter 
presents ideas for future research paths regarding the role of the German 
Bundestag, and notions pertaining to national parliaments in the decision-making 
process as it concerns security affairs.  
 
5.2. Factors that can influence decisions about troop deployment 
To understand the legislative- executive relations and the scope of the Bundestag to 
influence security policy, this thesis has evaluated factors that have an impact on the 
decisions to deploy troops abroad.   
 
Political party orientation is a vital factor in the decision-making process, and in 
legislative-executive relations. The role of party discipline is interesting to observe, 
as parliamentarians are believed to have a greater interest in holding executives 
accountable for their actions in cases of party dissension (Huff, 2015). Thus, the 
leading opposition in the German Bundestag is most likely to support the 
government’s proposal. This dissertation has shown that in the case of military 
operation regarding NAVFOR Atalanta, parliament’s voting results indicated a clear 
preference in favour of the executive’s proposal, as the decision to participate in the 
mission was supported by overall approval, with no dissenting votes. Political parties 
of the leading coalition tend to support the government in its decisions, as shown by 
the example of the NAVFOR Atalanta mission, which indicated that the CDU and 
SPD (the leading coalition at the time) supported the government’s proposal to 
participate in the mission. Across political party votes, military missions were 
contested among the radical left (Die Linke), and more support was given from the 
centre and right spectrum, with the political parties of the SPD and CDU supporting 
the leading government in its decision to deploy military troops. As parliaments and 
thus the political parties represent the public, public opinion is another crucial factor 
that can influence the decision- making process as parliamentarians are 
representatives of the electorate.  
 
 
A third factor that can influence the decisions about troop deployment is the nature of 
deployment. The Parliamentarians of the Bundestag, in particular of the opposition, 
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have the right of information about the ongoing work and projects of the German 
executive. Information can be obtained by asking questions in form of large inquiries 
which then will be discussed during the plenary sessions as well as small inquiries to 
which the executive has to give answers in form of written statements that are 
publicly accessible. The analysis of the plenary debates to discuss the deployment of 
German troops to participate in the NAVFOR Atalanta as well as the EUCAP 
Somalia shows that parliamentarians were particularly engaged when German 
national interests -humanitarian aid as well as economic interests to safeguard 
important sea ways- were in line with the overall purpose of the missions.  
 
5.3. Parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms to influence decisions about troop 
deployment 
There are several mechanisms available to the German Bundestag to influence 
decisions on the deployment of troops. In particular, this thesis has evaluated the 
Triple- A framework of Born and Haenggi (2005) that is based on authority, ability, 
and attitude. 
 
Authority: In some EU member state countries, national parliaments have the legal 
right to contribute to decision-making prior to troop deployment; nonetheless, the fact 
that decision-making often is in the hands of executives plays in favour for the claim 
that security policy is an executive domain, and as such, the role of national 
parliaments remains marginal. This imbalance in national security policies may affect 
the successful outcome of CSDP operations; for example, when decisions have to 
be brought before parliament, the process can hinder the rapid deployment of troops. 
In France or Britain, decision-making that involves deploying military troops are 
made by national executives. In the German case, the Bundestag has the legal right 
to prior approval before sending military troops abroad. The evaluation of the 
German Bundestag offers a substantial account on the role that legislative powers 
can play in decision-making regarding security affairs.  
 
Ability: The right of the German Bundestag to information is a crucial mechanism for 
parliamentary influence in the decision-making process regarding sending military 
troops abroad. Chapter 3 outlines the German Bundestag’s right to information from 
the German executive regarding missions granted, whereby parliament is informed 
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weekly of planned and current missions. Despite parliament’s right to information, 
there is still room for the executive to control, to a certain extent, the amount of 
information that parliament receives. Chapter 3 argues that reports to German 
Bundestag committees were often kept simple and reduced to provide basic 
information only. Peters, Wagner and Glahn (2014) note that the government briefs 
committees and answers queries posed by parliamentarians regarding planned and 
ongoing missions. The analysis of the two chosen CSDP missions shows that 
Bundestag parliamentarians raised questions and concerns during plenary debates.  
 
Attitude: A not- surprising finding of this study were the voting results related to 
Germany participating in the NAVFOR Atalanta mission, where the government’s 
proposal to deploy troops abroad was clearly supported by the leading party in the 
Bundestag. This finding can be understood as parliament not playing a decision-
making role as such, but simply following what the executive proposes. However, 
this study has shown that the process of approving participation in a mission is more 
complex. Chapter 4 indicates that the German Bundestag is much more than simply 
a rubber stamp actor, as MPs clearly highlighted their interest in both evaluated 
missions for this study, Atalanta and Somalia, by continuously demanding questions 
and information about their details, such as the amount of troops to be deployed, and 
details regarding budget planning for the mission.  
 
5.4. Thesis findings: the German Bundestag’s role in the decision-making 
process for deploying troops abroad 
De- or re-parliamentarisation?  
Chapter two discusses the role of national parliaments from a theoretical 
perspective, which contributes to an understanding of the possibilities for developing 
legislative mechanisms in order to scrutinise the executive’s decisions regarding 
troop deployment. The literature on EU integration claims a lack of democratic 
legitimacy, as competencies have been transferred from the national to the 
European level. Some scholars refer to this phenomenon as de-parliamentarisation, 
as national parliaments have lost power in the decision-making process regarding 
European matters. One strand of literature on EU integration argues that national 
parliaments have been described as ‘victims’, or ‘losers’ in the EU integration 
process (Andersen and Burns, 1996; Schuettemeyer, 2003; Labitzke, 2016), and 
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that channels for gaining access to information appear hindered. Chapter two also 
highlights the difficulty of exercising mechanisms when decisions, such as those in 
the framework of the CSDP, are made at a European level by national executives. 
Both factors make it more difficult for national parliaments, and thus for the German 
Bundestag, to exercise mechanisms for a successful scrutiny process.  
 
In contrast, the re-parliamentarisation opinion argues that national parliaments are 
viewed as instrumental in increasing democratic legitimacy, and thus have different 
mechanisms available for scrutinising their governments in order to avoid executives 
overpowering the negotiation process on EU matters (Herbel, 2017). This strand of 
literature argues that national parliaments have ‘fought their way back’ and have 
established methods for scrutinising European politics (Auel and Benz, 2005; 
O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007; Auel and Christiansen, 2015).  
 
The idea that the area of security policy is executive-led was reinforced by examining 
existing discussions and theories on EU integration, using the argument that the 
area of security policy is considered to have limited openness and a high level of 
secrecy, and is thus restricted within parliament, which is meant to be much more 
transparent. Yet the literature on EU integration and security policy has also 
established parliamentary influence through the ‘war powers’, which describes the 
legal right to veto decisions regarding troop deployment. Scholars have examined 
the presence of parliamentary veto rights (Wagner et al., 2010; Born et al., 2008) 
and the various parliamentary control competencies within security policy (Peters 
and Wagner, 2014), and have found that effective parliamentary scrutiny of CSDP-
related matters should be grounded in an understanding of institutional factors such 
as parliamentary prerogative (Maurer and Wessels, 2001; Huff, 2015).  
 
The German Bundestag was granted such parliamentary prerogative. The fact that 
the German Bundestag can only approve or disapprove the deployment of military 
forces abroad, and cannot amend any government’s proposal on the deployment of 
troops, weakens the position of parliament in the decision-making process. This 
study, however, contends the rather marginal role of parliament in the decision-
making process purely based on the fact that no military troops can be deployed 
without the consent of the German Bundestag. This was particularly noticeable when 
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examining the NAVFOR Atalanta mission, which had been important to German 
nationals, as well as having European and international interest.  
 
Rubber stamp or active scrutiniser? 
The Bundestag has no active say in decisions regarding civilian missions and the 
parliament cannot amend the mandates made by the executive to deploy troops 
abroad. However, this study suggests that it is more accurate to label the Bundestag 
an ‘active scrutiniser’. Despite the fact that the Bundestag has no right for approval 
regarding civilian missions, and thus no official power in the decision-making 
process, the chosen civilian mission (EUCAP Somalia) indicates that 
parliamentarians used the Bundestag plenary as a forum for discussion and 
information gathering. It can be argued, however, that this interest had been evoked 
because it was part of larger multilateral cooperation in the geographical area that 
also included the NAVFOR Atalanta mission, the latter being of particular importance 
to Germany, both as part of its multilateral cooperation, and for the country’s own 
national interests – to safeguard seaways, owing to Germany being among the 
world’s largest export nations. 
 
Overall, this study shows that the German Parliamentary Participation Act (2005) 
affects the degree to which the Bundestag can affect the decision-making process, 
as decisions to deploy troops are not only the responsibility of the executive, but also 
that of legislative powers. This renders the decision-making process more complex, 
as it may result in lengthy decision-making periods. However, it also highlights 
German security policy, as it has been described in the literature, of rather being 
‘shy’. In evaluating the NAVFOR Atalanta mission and the EUCAP Somalia mission, 
which represent both a military mission in which parliamentary approval is required, 
and a civilian mission in which parliamentary approval is not required, respectively, it 
was established that the German Bundestag had a real interest in participation, as it 
wanted to use the German Bundestag as a platform for discussions and demanding 
answers during several plenary debates. The study concludes that the German 
Bundestag can be regarded as an active scrutiniser, rather than a rubber stamp 
actor, via the application of several mechanisms: a) having legal authority prior to the 
deployment of German armed forces; b) the legal right and the interests of the 
Bundestag’s MPs of receiving information from the executive prior to, as well as 
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during military and civilian operations; c) the influence of political party orientation; 
and the influence of the German public opinion- the German MPs represent the 
German public’s opinion towards military participation and can act accordingly. To 
sum, the analysis of the two chosen CSDP operations, NAVFOR Atalanta and 
EUCAP Somalia, showed that the German legislature has a role to play in the 
decision-making process.  
 
5.5. Recommendations for future research 
This research examined the mechanisms that the German Bundestag can activate to 
influence the decision-making process on the deployment of military troops abroad 
under the CSDP umbrella. There are several additional research paths that can 
contribute to a better overall understanding of the role of national parliaments in 
legislative-executive relations as it pertains to security affairs.  
 
This research shows that parliamentary prerogative provides a strong mechanism for 
influencing the decision-making process regarding security affairs, as parliaments 
have the right to approve the deployment of troops prior to such action being 
effected. Thus, as the study focus is on Germany, where parliament is granted the 
right to give approval prior to military deployment, this study is limited to national 
parliaments in the EU that also require parliamentary approval, and cannot 
contribute to a general discussion on the nature of national parliaments in the EU 
decision-making process. Thus, additional research on the role of national 
parliaments in security affairs can address how, and to what extent, national 
parliaments can participate in the decision-making process if they are not granted a 
parliamentary prerogative. The factors and mechanisms available for national 
parliaments, as well as the motives for engaging in the legislative-executive decision-
making process may vary, and depend on each country’s national policy 
arrangements.  As noted in Chapter two, not all all national parliaments in the EU 
have same tools available for participating in the decision-making process as it 
concerns missions under the CSDP framework. While some scholars have already 




A second area of research includes exploring the different types of parliamentary 
actors in the scrutiny process, such as the role of individual MPs or parliamentary 
committees. This thesis evaluated the strategies of political parties from a limited 
perspective, that is, from the opposition and from the leading coalition perspective in 
the plenary sessions of the German Bundestag. Although there is a small amount of 
literature with a focus on parliamentarians in EU policy-making (e.g., Sprungk, 2007; 
Auel and Christiansen, 2016), little attention has been given to the field of security 
policy. Auel and Christiansen (2016), for example, explore the incentives and driving 
forces of parliamentary actors, with their main argument being that in order to 
understand parliamentary actions, it is important to understand the parliamentary 
actors themselves. The researchers note that parliamentarians can act as rational 
actors with preferences, making decisions based on costs and benefits. Further 
research can involve the area of security policy to examine whether parliamentarians 
have certain preferences in this context, too, and will therefore be willing to enhance 
parliamentary scrutiny in the decision-making process.  
 
A third research path could include the analysis of a variety of missions, with 
different geographical locations, or different purposes of deployment. The study only 
examined two missions conducted by the CSDP, one military and one civilian 
mission, which both occurred in the same geographical area (the Horn of Africa), and 
both had a very similar mission aim: to safeguard the area from piracy. It is therefore 
questionable whether the decision-making process can be compared to other 
missions in which Germany has participated. The selection of the NAVFOR Atalanta 
and EUCAP Somalia missions was made due to the high level of German 
participation in the Horn of Africa area. It is also possible that the civilian mission in 
Somalia sparked particular interest among German parliamentarians, due to its long-
standing and important links from a German perspective, as it affects seaways that 
are particularly important for the nation’s exports. In other civilian cases, the German 
Bundestag may have had less interest, particularly as no parliamentary approval is 
required prior to participation, and as such, indicate a difference from military 
missions.  
 
A fourth area of future research can expand this research by including more 
countries in which the national parliament also has parliamentary prerogative. The 
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study focused only on the role of the German Bundestag. Single case studies allow 
for a deeper examination of the phenomenon being studied than investigations 
including two or more countries. This study is limited, as it only allows for 
investigation of the German parliament, rather than including a cross-country 
comparison. To properly construct an analysis of the German Bundestag in the 
legislative-executive relationship in the decision-making process regarding 
participation in missions under the CSDP umbrella, more operations if not every 
single one in which German armed forces have participated are needed for analysis. 
Furthermore, the operations under investigation are both performed under the CSDP 
umbrella and exclude UN- or NATO missions which could be helpful in order to 
establish whether there is a difference in Germany’s objectives. This dissertation 
focused on the role of the German Bundestag only, and therefore does not represent 
a comprehensive assessment of all national parliaments in the EU in which a prior 
parliamentary prerogative is required to deploy armed forces. By doing so, it would 
be possible to ascertain whether the scrutiny mechanisms that have been 
established for this particular research on the German Bundestag match those in 
other countries; alternatively, different mechanisms can be established that have the 
same or even a different influence on the legislative-executive relationship as it 
concerns security affairs.  
 
Even though this section highlights several paths for future research, the findings of 
this thesis provide an indication of the role of the German Bundestag in decisions on 
CSDP-related matters, and thus contributes to knowledge regarding the field of 
European integration studies, EU security studies, and literature on German security 
policy. This in turn provides a deeper understanding of how and to what extent the 
German Bundestag can participate in the decision- making process on CSDP-related 
matters, regarding both military and civilian operations. Although this research does 
not predict the behaviour of all national parliaments of the member states, by taking 
the example of the German Bundestag, the research findings point towards several 
aspects through which national parliaments are able to exercise scrutiny regarding 





5.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has provided the overall conclusion of this thesis. This dissertation aims 
to contribute to the already existing literature by analysing the role of the German 
Bundestag in the decision-making process, by establishing the scrutiny mechanisms 
that can influence legislative-executive relations in decisions regarding CSDP-related 
affairs. This dissertation analysed two CSDP missions, one military and one civilian, 
in a bid to assess legislative-executive relations in the decision-making process, in 
order to establish to what extent the German Bundestag can influence the 
executive’s decision to deploy German troops abroad. The importance of the 
German parliamentary prerogative, which was implemented as a result of Germany’s 
war past was emphasised. This prerogative provides opportunities for the Bundestag 
to become involved in the decision-making process and thus can be regarded as an 
active scrutiniser. This thesis has also established that even though there has been 
a shift in German security policy from ‘never again’ to actively participating in armed 
conflicts with German armed forces, the German focus remains on the focus of 
humanitarian aid. Germany wishes to safeguard its parliamentary prerogative as it 
has become part of German security policy. At the same time, Germany wishes to 
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